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In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, local
police across the country instituted blanket searches without
individualized suspicion at various venues—including political
protests, sporting events, subway platforms, and public ferries—all in
an attempt to prevent further terrorist attacks. When evaluating these
searches, courts rely upon the special needs doctrine, which allows the
government to conduct a suspicionless search as long as the search
serves a special need distinct from the goals of law enforcement. Over
the past eight years, courts have struggled to determine whether and
how the special needs doctrine applies to these searches, and these
struggles have produced inconsistent results.
This Article first reviews the history of antiterrorism searches,
which can be roughly divided into three different time periods. In the
early 1970s, in response to an epidemic of hijackings and bombings of
public buildings, the government instituted a regime of suspicionless
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searches at airports and public buildings—searches which continue to
this day. During the second period, the imminent danger of these
terrorist actions abated, but courts continued to reject challenges to
the searches, and suspicionless searches spread to other contexts far
removed from the terrorist threat. Finally, in the third era, which
began in 2001 and continues to the present day, the government has
aggressively expanded its use of antiterrorism searches, and courts
face a new set of challenges in evaluating their constitutionality.
This Article then explains why antiterrorism searches cannot be
justified under the special needs doctrine, and indeed why—in their
current form—these searches cannot be justified under any Fourth
Amendment doctrine. It then proposes a solution: suspicionless
searches to prevent terrorism should be permitted, but only if the
fruits of the search cannot be used in a subsequent criminal
prosecution. Although the solution at first seems controversial, it
represents a reasonable balance between the need to protect the
country from terrorist attacks and the need to draw a principled
distinction between special needs searches and general searches.
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INTRODUCTION
Consider a hypothetical. The United States is the victim of
1
multiple terrorist attacks, and traditional law enforcement techniques
have consistently been proven ineffective. In response, federal law
enforcement agents institute a regime of blanket searches, conducted
without any degree of individualized suspicion. These suspicionless
searches work, and in a very short period of time the terrorist attacks
abate. Meanwhile, the search regimes are inevitably subjected to a
series of challenges in court. The judges, seeing the efficacy of these
programs, unanimously approve of the searches by exploiting—and
expanding—a relatively obscure loophole in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. Stability returns to the nation. The question: what
happens to the suspicionless searches once the terrorist attacks have
been eliminated?
1. Throughout this Article, the word “terrorism” will be used to denote the use or threat
of violence with the intent to intimidate, usually for ideological or political purposes. See
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1854 (3d ed. 1992).
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The answer: they continue indefinitely. And why not? They have
proven themselves effective—indeed, indispensable—in preventing
widespread acts of violence. They have been sanctioned by the courts.
And most importantly, every year that they continue, the citizens who
are consistently subjected to these searches become more and more
accustomed to them, until they no longer seem to be intrusive.
Instead, if the searches are noticed at all, they are thought to be
merely a minor annoyance, an inevitable facet of modern life.
This is not a hypothetical from our potential future; it is a lesson
from our recent past. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, international
hijackers and domestic terrorists caused widespread violence and
social unrest in this country. These attacks stopped only after the
government ordered searches of every airplane passenger and every
visitor to federal courthouses. Courts upheld these suspicionless
searches by applying a legal theory called the administrative search
doctrine, which had been recently developed to allow health
inspectors access to homes without needing to demonstrate
individualized suspicion. Now, nearly forty years later, entire
generations have grown up assuming the only way to board an
airplane or enter a courthouse is to be subjected to a search by law
enforcement personnel.
But if we are to learn a lesson from this history, it is not clear
what the lesson should be. We have effectively traded liberty for
security, but even now it is difficult to measure how much liberty we
have lost and how much security we have gained. Are suspicionless
searches at airports and public courthouses merely a minor
annoyance, or a severe and unjustified privacy intrusion into our
privacy made all the more Orwellian by the fact that we only perceive
them to be a minor annoyance? And how much more secure are we
with these searches—or rather, how much security would we lose if
we abolished these searches and required police to play by the normal
rules to prevent these crimes?
Following the terrorist attacks of 2001, these are no longer
academic questions. History is repeating itself. In the wake of the
September 11 attacks, local police across the country instituted
suspicionless search regimes at political protests, sporting events,
subway platforms, and public ferries, all in an attempt to prevent
further terrorist attacks. Courts now struggle to determine whether
the same doctrine that justified suspicionless searches at airports and
public courthouses can be used to support this second generation of
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searches. And many academics—usually ready to denounce and
criticize new restrictions on Fourth Amendment rights—have
scrambled to find ways to justify these searches under existing Fourth
2
Amendment jurisprudence, or have argued that the old Fourth
Amendment rules simply do not or should not apply in the face of a
3
terrorist threat.
This Article evaluates the constitutionality of today’s
antiterrorism suspicionless searches. It argues that one cannot
effectively evaluate the validity of these searches without first
understanding and critiquing the initial wave of antiterrorism
suspicionless searches, all of which were unanimously approved by
the courts in the early 1970s. Thus, this Article breaks up the
development of antiterrorism searches into three time periods: the
early 1970s, when courts first instituted and upheld airport and
courthouse searches; the 1980s and 1990s, when terrorist attacks
abated and the searches became ingrained in American culture; and
the modern era, from 2001 until the present, in which the government
seeks to extend the scope of the searches and courts are once again
being called upon to evaluate their constitutionality.
Of course, suspicionless searches are not confined to the
antiterrorism context. In fact, just before the first antiterrorism
searches were being reviewed by the appellate courts in the early
1970s, the Supreme Court created an entirely new doctrine which

2. See, e.g., Ricardo J. Bascuas, Fourth Amendment Lessons from the Highway and the
Subway: A Principled Approach to Suspicionless Searches, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 719, 722 (2007)
(stating that the New York City subway searches are “uncontroversial” and that the case for
such searches is “relatively easy to make”); Richard C. Worf, The Case for Rational Basis
Review of General Suspicionless Searches and Seizures, 23 TOURO L. REV. 93, 131–37 (2007)
(arguing that suspicionless searches should be seen as reasonable and thus constitutional if they
have been approved by a representative legislative body, because the legislative process will
correct any overreaching by law enforcement). But see Anthony C. Coveny, When the
Immovable Object Meets the Unstoppable Force: Search and Seizure in the Age of Terrorism, 31
AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 329, 384 (2007) (criticizing the holdings in antiterrorism search cases and
noting that “whenever a bright line rule is replaced by a balancing test, civil liberties are likely
to lose”).
3. See, e.g., Ronald M. Gould & Simon Stern, Catastrophic Threats and the Fourth
Amendment, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 777, 777 (2004) (asserting that “traditional Fourth Amendment
search-and-seizure doctrine was fine for an age of flintlocks,” but that “large-scale searches
undertaken to prevent horrific potential harms may be constitutionally sound”). But see John T.
Parry, Terrorism and the New Criminal Process, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 765, 834–35
(2007) (concluding that “the war on terror has generated extraordinary criminal processes
applicable to people suspected of terrorism” and that the costs of this change are significant,
including that “state power over all of us—over our bodies, our mobility, our words and actions,
and of course our lives—continues to increase”).
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allowed the government to conduct a search or seizure without any
showing of individualized suspicion. It is this doctrine, known as the
administrative search doctrine, which the early courts ultimately used
to justify the antiterrorism searches. Although the Court has
described these cases as a “closely guarded category of
4
constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches,” they in fact
cover a broad range of situations. They include searches to enforce
regulatory violations, mandatory drug testing of schoolchildren and
public employees, inventory searches, immigration and drunk driving
checkpoints, and searches of probationers and parolees. The doctrine
underlying these cases is murky at best, and judges and commentators
disagree as to whether these cases all fall into the same category or
5
should be considered doctrinally distinct. For now, I will refer to
them all as “permissible suspicionless searches,” meaning searches
that are permissible even if the government does not have any
amount of individualized suspicion of the subject being searched.
The first three Parts of this Article detail the changes to
antiterrorism searches and the permissible suspicionless search
doctrine for each of these three time periods. Part I covers the first
era, approximately 1968–1976, and examines both the government’s
reaction to the first wave of terrorism, as well as the birth and early
application of the permissible suspicionless search doctrine. Part II
describes the second era, roughly 1977–2000, which was a time of
relative calm between the two waves of terrorism. Despite the relative
calm during this period, the permissible suspicionless searches at
airports and courthouses became more firmly entrenched in the law,
and among the general public they became an unquestioned—and
perhaps even comforting—aspect of traveling by air or entering a
federal building. Meanwhile, outside the terrorism context, the
permissible suspicionless search doctrine was evolving and expanding
4. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 309 (1997) (declaring unconstitutional a Georgia law
that conditioned one’s candidacy for state office on passing a drug test).
5. The Ninth Circuit, for example, breaks these cases down into three categories that are
“not necessarily mutually-exclusive”: searches at “exempted areas” (such as international
borders, prisons, airports, and entrances to government buildings), “administrative” searches,
and “special needs” searches. United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 822–23 (9th Cir. 2004).
Professor Schulhofer, meanwhile, distinguishes the “administrative” searches and the “internal
governance” searches (such as those that occur in schools and public workplaces) from the
mandatory drug testing laws that are actually intended to deter and punish the use of illegal
drugs. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, On the Fourth Amendment Rights of the Law-Abiding Public,
1989 SUP. CT. REV. 87, 162–63.
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to cover a variety of different contexts, acquiring along the way a new
name: special needs searches. Finally, Part III discusses the modern
era, from 2001 to the present, when terrorism again became a
palpable threat to this country, and law enforcement once again
responded with suspicionless searches to prevent future attacks.
During the present era, however, courts have become more critical of
suspicionless searches, both in the antiterrorism context and in other
areas, ultimately leading to a confusing legal test and an inconsistent
application of that test when it is applied to antiterrorism searches.
After the Article traces the development of both antiterrorism
searches and the permissible suspicionless search doctrine, Part IV
critically analyzes the special needs doctrine. This Part breaks the
special needs cases up into three different categories: searches made
outside the criminal context, searches made in the context of criminal
activity but whose results are not turned over to law enforcement, and
searches made in the context of a criminal case whose results are used
by law enforcement. This Part concludes that suspicionless
antiterrorism searches fall into the third category—a category that
cannot be justified by the special needs doctrine. Part V examines
other possible justifications for suspicionless antiterrorism searches,
including analyzing these cases under a generalized reasonableness
test and relying on implied consent. This Part concludes that no other
justifications are valid, given the very real danger of a slippery slope
and the need for a principled distinction between searches that
require individualized suspicion and those that do not. This creates a
significant problem: if suspicionless antiterrorism searches are
unconstitutional under the principles of the Fourth Amendment, how
can law enforcement protect us from the very real threat of
terrorism?
Part VI will propose a solution to this problem: suspicionless
antiterrorism searches would be constitutionally justified under the
special needs doctrine as long as any contraband that is recovered
cannot be used in a criminal prosecution. By giving law enforcement
the opportunity to choose between a suspicionless search that is truly
aimed only at preventing terrorism and a more traditional search that
could result in criminal prosecution, this proposal gives the police
more power to search when there is a true terrorist threat, yet
encourages them to develop more sophisticated and less intrusive
methods of investigation when they are seeking to apprehend and
prosecute wrongdoers.
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I. THE FIRST ERA: 1968–1976
The government’s use of antiterrorism suspicionless searches
began in the late 1960s, in response to a series of hijackings and
bombings of government buildings across the country. At about the
same time, the Supreme Court created the administrative search
doctrine, which permitted suspicionless searches as long as they were
6
not “aimed at the discovery of evidence of a crime.” When it came
time for courts to review the antiterrorism suspicionless searches,
many of them turned to the administrative search doctrine to evaluate
and ultimately approve of this method of detecting and apprehending
terrorists.
A. The First Wave of Terror: Hijackings and Bombings
The late 1960s was a time of severe social unrest in this country.
The civil rights movement, opposition to the Vietnam War, protests
against the regime of Fidel Castro, and Palestinian claims of
sovereignty all motivated radical elements of the population to
engage in acts of domestic terrorism. Bombings of public buildings
and other high-profile targets increased dramatically. Although the
country had experienced forms of domestic terrorism before, the
unrest had previously been limited to political fringe groups or
7
specific segments of the population. During the late 1960s, police
departments, courthouses, foreign missions, university offices,
prisons, the Pentagon, and the United States capitol building were all
8
targets of bomb attacks. According to a report by the Federal Bureau

6. Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967) (asserting the reasonableness of codeenforcement inspections).
7. For example, in 1857 a group of Mormons in Utah declared themselves to be in open
rebellion against the United States and slaughtered 120 settlers on their way to California. See
Eugene E. Campbell, Governmental Beginnings, in UTAH’S HISTORY 153, 165–71 (Richard D.
Poll et al. eds., 1989). The late-nineteenth century saw a number of violent acts committed
during labor disputes or by anarchists attempting to topple the United States government. See,
e.g., Nicholas von Hoffman, To Kill Everyman; A New Chapter in American Terrorism, WASH.
POST, Oct. 15, 1995, at B3 (describing the changing targets of terrorist attacks). And racial
violence perpetrated by groups such as the Ku Klux Klan caused many deaths in the early-tomid-twentieth century. However horrible these terrorists’ actions were, in sheer number they
did not compare to the widespread bombings of public buildings in the late 1960s. See infra
notes 8–9 and accompanying text.
8. See Thomas R. Brooks, Editorial, The Radical Underground Surfaces with a Bang, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 15, 1970, (Magazine), at 171; see also Michael Taylor, ‘70s in the Bay Area—Era of
Radical Violence, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 24, 2007, at A1.
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of Investigation, there were 3,000 bombings and 50,000 bomb threats
9
in 1970 alone. These attacks, alongside a series of high-profile
political assassinations, including Robert Kennedy and Martin Luther
King, Jr., heightened the perception of a tidal wave of violent social
10
unrest sweeping the country.
Around the same time, the country experienced an epidemic of
airplane hijackings. In the decade preceding 1968, hijackings had
averaged only one per year, but in 1968 there were eighteen, and in
11
1969 there were thirty-three. In one particularly notorious incident
in 1970, a radical Palestinian group hijacked four planes bound for
New York City and flew them to Jordan and Egypt, where the
12
terrorists ultimately blew up all four planes on the landing field.
The government’s response to this rise in both domestic and
international terrorism included broad new search procedures at the
entrances to public buildings and at airports. In the fall of 1970, the
federal General Services Administration issued an order requiring
searches of all bags and packages at entrances to every federal
13
building. Meanwhile, on September 11, 1970, President Richard
Nixon issued a directive for the Department of Transportation,
requiring its agents to work with airlines to institute surveillance
14
programs at all domestic airports. This directive was followed by a
series of rules promulgated by the Federal Aviation Administration
in 1972 requiring all airline passengers and their luggage to be
9. See FBI, History of the FBI: Vietnam War Era: 1960s–1970s, http://www.fbi.gov/
libref/historic/history/vietnam.htm (last visited Dec. 22, 2009) (describing violence in opposition
to the Vietnam War).
10. See generally The American Century, 1960–1969, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1999, at A10
(detailing the major political and social events of the 1960s).
11. United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 898 (9th Cir. 1973), abrogated by United States v.
Aukai, 497 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). The high number of hijackings continued into the
next decade: twenty-five in 1970, twenty-five in 1971, and twenty-six in 1972. The numbers
finally dropped to single digits for most of the rest of the 1970s, and dropped to zero by the
1990s. See OFFICE OF CIVIL AVIATION SEC., FED. AVIATION ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP.,
CRIMINAL ACTS AGAINST CIVIL AVIATION 75 (2000).
12. See Eric Pace, Disclosure Is Made by Amman Radio, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1970, at A1.
The four planes were all destroyed on September 12, 1970. Id.; see also Cynthia R. Fagan, Iraq’s
Oil for Terror; $72 Million to Palestinians, N.Y. POST, Oct. 17, 2004, at 13.
13. Downing v. Kunzig, 454 F.2d 1230, 1231 (6th Cir. 1972). The Government Services
Administration (GSA) order stated: “[B]ecause of the recent outburst of bombings and other
acts of violence, effective at once, at all entrances to federal property under the charge and
control of GSA, where there are guards on duty, all packages shall be inspected for bombs or
other potentially harmful devices. Admittance should be denied to anyone who refuses to
voluntarily submit packages for examination.” Id.
14. Davis, 482 F.2d at 899–900.
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15

screened prior to boarding an airplane. These requirements have
16
remained in place ever since, and security screenings have become a
familiar fixture at every federal building and commercial airport in
the country.
The suspicionless searches were challenged almost immediately,
and were universally upheld by the courts, which went out of their
way to emphasize the grave risk posed by the threat of terrorism. The
Sixth Circuit conceded that “[o]rdinarily . . . a person should not have
his person or property subjected to a search in the absence of a
warrant or probable cause to believe that a crime is being
17
committed,” but also argued that, given the recent wave of violence,
18
“the dangers to federal property and personnel were imminent.”
The court concluded that “in times of emergency[,] government may
take reasonable steps to assure that its property and personnel are
19
protected against damage, injury or destruction.” The Ninth Circuit
similarly upheld suspicionless searches at a San Francisco
20
courthouse. In reaching its conclusion, the court relied on the fact
that there were “specific instances of bomb threats and bomb attacks
directed at San Francisco police stations, Oakland police stations, and
21
the Los Angeles federal building.” Moreover, the court noted that
terrorists had recently kidnapped four individuals and killed a judge
22
in a nearby county. Given this background of violence, the court
determined that “a serious threat of violence existed at the Hall of
Justice,” and therefore courthouse searches were a reasonable

15. See Davis, 482 F.2d at 900–02 (noting a February 1 rule requiring air carriers to
implement a screening system, an August 1 directive requiring airlines to search the baggage
and screen or search the person of passengers meeting a particular profile, and a December 1
order requiring searches of all carry-on items and screening of all passengers).
16. In 2002, federal law enforcement agents replaced private airline employees as
screeners. Federal Screeners Just One Component of Air Safety Net, USA TODAY, Nov. 19, 2002,
at 20A.
17. Downing, 454 F.2d at 1232–33.
18. Id. at 1232.
19. Id. at 1233. The court also held that the searches were not very intrusive, stating that
inspection of bags and packages was a “very minimal type of interference with personal
freedom,” which was reasonable given the government’s need to protect itself against the
“ruthless forces bent upon its destruction.” Id.
20. See McMorris v. Alioto, 567 F.2d 897, 901 (9th Cir. 1978).
21. Id. at 900.
22. Id.
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precaution to prevent further violence against the courthouse and its
23
personnel.
24
Judges reacted similarly to suspicionless searches in airports. In
approving the new security measures, these courts emphasized the
extraordinary harm that was caused by terrorist attacks. The Ninth

23. Id. Legal commentators at the time expressed some concern that the government was
overreacting, even given this background of violence. See, e.g., Kenneth L. Jesmore, The
Courthouse Search, 21 UCLA L. REV. 797, 825 (1974) (“[Courthouse searches] are seldom
founded upon an adequate correlation between the scope of the search procedures and the
necessity for their implementation. . . . An ongoing emergency—a current, serious threat of
violence—may provide the justification necessary . . . . [but t]he threat, of course, can be neither
stale nor insignificant, and the intrusion must be limited according to the severity of the
emergency.”).
The Supreme Court did not rule on any case regarding courthouse bombings or
hijackings. However, in United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972), the
Court acknowledged the heightened danger of terrorism in a case in which the government
wiretapped a suspected terrorist. The Court noted that “threats and acts of sabotage against the
Government exist in sufficient number to justify investigative powers with respect to them. The
covertness and complexity of potential unlawful conduct against the Government and the
necessary dependency of many conspirators upon the telephone make electronic surveillance an
effective investigatory instrument in certain circumstances.” Id. at 311–12 (footnote omitted).
However, the Court ultimately ruled against the prosecutor, concluding that “the Government’s
concerns do not justify departure in this case from the customary Fourth Amendment
requirement of judicial approval prior to initiation of a search or surveillance.” Id. at 321.
24. See, e.g., United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496, 499–501 (2d Cir. 1974) (holding that
the warrantless preboarding search of an airline passenger’s beach bag was reasonable when the
passenger was given sufficient notice that she was free to avoid the search by leaving the line);
United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799, 806 (2d Cir. 1974) (“[T]he use of a magnetometer is a
reasonable search despite the small number of weapons detected in the course of a large
number of searches. The absolutely minimal invasion in all respects of a passenger’s privacy
weighed against the great threat to hundreds of persons if a hijacker is able to proceed to the
plane undetected is determinative of the reasonableness of the search.”); United States v.
Cyzewski, 484 F.2d 509, 512 (5th Cir. 1973) (“[C]ourts have consistently held airport security
measures constitutionally justified as a limited and relatively insignificant intrusion of privacy
balanced against the need to protect aircraft and its passengers.”); United States v. Davis, 482
F.2d 893, 910–11 (9th Cir. 1973) (holding that preboarding screening of passengers and carry-on
items for weapons or explosives is reasonable so long as the passenger can choose to avoid the
search by not boarding the aircraft), abrogated by United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955 (9th Cir.
2007) (en banc); United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272, 1276 (5th Cir. 1973)
(“[R]easonableness does not require that officers search only those passengers who meet a
profile or . . . who otherwise appear suspicious.”); United States v. Slocum, 464 F.2d 1180, 1182
(3d Cir. 1972) (concluding that, because of the potential serious dangers of aircraft hijackings,
the use of a magnetometer to screen airline passengers is justified by a reasonable governmental
interest); United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667, 673 (2d Cir. 1972) (“In view of the magnitude of
the crime sought to be prevented[ and] the exigencies of time which clearly precluded the
obtaining of a warrant, the use of the magnetometer is . . . a reasonable precaution.”); United
States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769, 771 (4th Cir. 1972) (asserting that magnetometer searches are
justified by the minimal invasion of personal privacy and overwhelming governmental interest
in preventing air piracy).
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Circuit noted that “[t]he need to prevent airline hijacking is
unquestionably grave and urgent. The potential damage to person
and property from such acts is enormous. The disruption of air traffic
is severe. There is serious risk of complications in our foreign
25
relations.” Suspicionless searches were seen as the only way to
prevent these terrorist acts because “[l]ittle can be done to balk the
malefactor after such material is successfully smuggled aboard, and as
yet there is no foolproof method of confining the search to the few
26
who are potential hijackers.” In upholding suspicionless airport
searches, the Fifth Circuit implied that they would be temporary:
“Certainly all citizens look forward to the day when skyjackings and
their sequels, airport search and security measures, cease. When the
threat of air piracy disappears the standards of reasonableness which
27
we here recognize will go with it.”
The language of these opinions demonstrates that these
suspicionless searches were seen as an extraordinary solution to an
extraordinary problem. As one judge noted in 1976: “In the wake of
unprecedented airport bombings, aircraft piracy and courtroom
violence, the courts have approved precautionary security measures
which cannot be reconciled with previously conceived notions of the
citizen’s protection under the Fourth Amendment against warrantless
28
intrusions without probable cause.”
Although courts generally agreed that these searches were
necessary, they initially struggled to find a doctrinal justification for
their holdings. Some courts simply applied the “unreasonable
searches” language of the Fourth Amendment and concluded that the
searches were reasonable given the nature of the threat and the
29
relatively low level of intrusion. Others analogized suspicionless
searches in airports to searches at the border, and applied a three-part
balancing test, including the nature of the threat, the level of the
intrusion, and the efficacy of the search in actually preventing the

25. Davis, 482 F.2d at 910 (footnote omitted). The Ninth Circuit also held that these
searches have an element of implied consent: “[A]irport screening searches are valid only if they
recognize the right of a person to avoid search by electing not to board the aircraft.” Id. at 910–
11. The consent justification for these searches has recently been questioned by some courts. See
infra notes 316–20 and accompanying text.
26. Davis, 482 F.2d at 910.
27. Skipwith, 482 F.2d at 1279.
28. Collier v. Miller, 414 F. Supp. 1357, 1362 (S.D. Tex. 1976).
29. See, e.g., Downing v. Kunzig, 454 F.2d 1230, 1233 (6th Cir. 1972).
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30

harm. Still others held that the individual being searched had given a
sort of implied consent because he or she could always avoid the
search by simply choosing not to board the plane or enter the
31
government building. But most courts placed these searches into a
recently developed category of suspicionless searches known as
administrative searches—and this category is where they have
remained for the subsequent four decades.
B. The Birth of the Administrative Search Doctrine and the End of
Individualized Suspicion
The Fourth Amendment prohibits “unreasonable searches and
seizures,” and states that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
32
cause.” This pair of restrictions has led to differing interpretations as
33
to how the Amendment should be applied in practice, which in turn
has led to a thoroughly confusing body of jurisprudence. Courts have
generally held that a search is unconstitutional unless it is supported
34
by a warrant or probable cause, but they have also used the
“reasonableness” language to support exceptions to this general rule.
For example, courts allow brief pat-down searches for weapons on a
35
showing of less than probable cause to protect an officer’s safety.

30. See, e.g., Skipwith, 482 F.2d at 1275.
31. See, e.g., Singleton v. Comm’r, 606 F.2d 50, 52 (3d Cir. 1979) (“By electing to proceed
and board the aircraft, with advance notice of the search requirement, [the passenger] impliedly
consented to the search.”); Davis, 482 F.2d at 910–11. The implied-consent justification was
recently rejected by the Ninth Circuit. See United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955, 960–61 (9th Cir.
2007) (en banc). For a critique of the implied-consent justification, see infra Part V.C.
32. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
33. See Bascuas, supra note 2, at 723–25 (explaining that the “warrant preference”
interpretation, with certain exceptions, requires that searches and seizures be made under a
warrant and with probable cause, whereas the “general reasonableness” interpretation requires
only that searches and seizures be reasonable in the context of the particular case). Most
scholars today focus on the “unreasonable” language, arguing for a broad balancing test in
determining whether or not a given search is constitutional. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Terry
and Fourth Amendment First Principles, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1097, 1118, 1120–25 (1998)
(discussing different factors that may help to determine whether or not a search is reasonable,
including: the scope and intrusiveness of the search, the weight of the governmental interest at
issue, and the identity of the subject being searched).
34. See, e.g., Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 667 (1989)
(“Even where it is reasonable to dispense with the warrant requirement in the particular
circumstances, a search ordinarily must be based on probable cause.”).
35. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 23–24, 28–31 (1968) (holding that a police officer’s
limited search of three men for weapons was reasonable because the men’s unusual conduct
gave the officer reasonable ground to believe, in light of his experience, that the search was
necessary to prevent harm to himself and others).
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And if there is probable cause to make an arrest, the Supreme Court
has held that a search of the suspect is reasonable to protect officer
36
safety and preserve evidence for later use at trial.
In each of these cases, however, courts require some form of
individualized suspicion (albeit short of probable cause) before the
37
search can take place. In fact, prior to 1967, the only context in
which the Supreme Court allowed nonconsensual suspicionless
38
searches was at the international border, pursuant to longstanding
39
and relatively noncontroversial case law. But all that changed in the
40
case of Camara v. Municipal Court.
In Camara, the Court held that a health inspector was not
required to demonstrate probable cause—nor indeed any form of
41
individualized suspicion—to obtain a warrant to investigate a home.
According to the Court, there was no need to require individualized
suspicion because the searches were not “aimed at the discovery of
42
evidence of crime.” The Court also stated that a probable cause
requirement would be impracticable because the hidden nature of

36. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234 (1973); Weeks v. United States, 232
U.S. 383, 395–96 (1914) (affirming the principle that evidence found incidental to the execution
of a legal search warrant is admissible at trial when material and properly offered in evidence
because this evidence was not the product of an unreasonable search and seizure).
37. For searches incident to arrest, no further amount of individualized suspicion is
required after the arrest is made—but of course the arrest itself is not legal unless the police
have some amount of individualized suspicion against the suspect, and if they do not, the
subsequent search incident to the arrest is invalid. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762–63
(1969).
38. Of course, the most common form of search used by law enforcement is the consent
search, which does not require any amount of individualized suspicion—but does require the
suspect to agree to be searched. See United States v. Miller, 20 F.3d 926, 930 (8th Cir. 1994)
(“[P]olice officers may search an area, even without probable cause or a warrant, if someone
with adequate authority has consented to the search . . . .”); United States v. Morris, 910 F.
Supp. 1428, 1446 (N.D. Iowa 1995) (explaining that for a consensual search to be valid, the
consent must be voluntary, must not have been “tainted by any other Fourth Amendment
violation,” and must not exceed the “reasonable scope” of the consent).
39. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925) (“Travelers may be so stopped in
crossing an international boundary because of national self protection reasonably requiring one
entering the country to identify himself as entitled to come in, and his belongings as effects
which may be lawfully brought in.”); see also infra notes 135–38 and accompanying text.
40. Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
41. Id. at 528 (overruling Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959), which held that a health
inspector could enter a home even without first obtaining a warrant).
42. Id. at 537.
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dangerous conditions in homes would prevent an inspector from
43
being able to demonstrate probable cause.
Over the next fifteen years, the Court applied the administrative
search doctrine in numerous regulatory contexts, approving warrants
issued in the absence of individualized suspicion for Occupational
44
Safety and Health Administration workplace inspections, and
permitting warrantless inspections of certain industries that were
45
46
closely regulated, such as liquor stores, sellers of firearms, and
47
mines. In these cases, the Court added another rationale for
abandoning the individualized suspicion requirement: the individuals
and businesses engaged in these industries were fully aware of the
pervasive regulation in their field and therefore had a reduced
48
expectation of privacy.
Courts also applied the administrative search doctrine to a
category of cases known as inventory searches. Police officers
frequently take custody of personal property, either pursuant to
criminal activity (for example, when they arrest an intoxicated driver
49
and impound the car), or pursuant to other duties (for example,
when they tow a car in violation of parking regulations, or find an
50
abandoned bag in a public place). When police officers take custody
of such property, they routinely conduct an “inventory search.” As
the Supreme Court noted in 1976, the goals of such searches are not
the discovery or investigation of a crime, but rather to (1) protect the
owner’s property, (2) avoid false claims of lost or stolen property by
51
the owner, and (3) protect the police from potential danger. Thus,
the Court concluded that inventory searches were part of the

43. Id. The Court also noted that these types of suspicionless inspections had been
traditionally accepted by the courts and by the general public. Id.
44. Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 320 (1978).
45. Collonade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 77 (1970).
46. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 317 (1972).
47. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 606 (1981).
48. See, e.g., Biswell, 406 U.S. at 315–16.
49. See, e.g., People v. Trusty, 516 P.2d 423, 424 (Colo. 1973).
50. See, e.g., People v. Sullivan, 272 N.E.2d 464, 466 (N.Y. 1971).
51. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 378 (1976). Opperman merely confirmed the
overwhelming conclusion of the lower courts; prior to the case, almost every state and circuit
court that considered the question had held that inventory searches were permissible. Some
lower courts had held that an inventory search was not technically a search under the Fourth
Amendment, whereas some had concluded—as the Supreme Court ultimately did—that
inventory searches were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 369–71 (listing
over twenty-five state and circuit court opinions).
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52

“routine, administrative caretaking” functions of the police, rather
than part of its law enforcement functions, and approved inventory
53
searches even in the absence of individualized suspicion.
In one sense, it is not surprising that some appellate courts
turned to the administrative search doctrine when seeking to justify
suspicionless antiterrorism searches in the early 1970s because at the
time there was no other doctrine that specifically permitted
54
suspicionless searches. And given the very real and immediate
danger posed by the terrorists who were hijacking airplanes and
blowing up public buildings in the late 1960s, the government had a
reasonable argument that these searches served a purpose other than
crime control: to wit, they were designed to secure the safety of
55
airline passengers and government personnel. As the Ninth Circuit
explained, the searches were “part of a general regulatory scheme in
furtherance of an administrative purpose, rather than as part of a
56
criminal investigation to secure evidence of crime.”
This rationale was not surprising—and perhaps even justifiable,
given the quasi emergency the country faced at the time. But even
during this early stage, the use of the administrative search doctrine
to justify antiterrorism searches was legally suspect. When juxtaposed
against inspections for building code safety violations and routine
cataloging of the contents of impounded vehicles, widespread
suspicionless searches at airports and at courthouses stand out rather
dramatically. In the first place, they are much broader in scope,
affecting a much larger portion of the population—today, it is fair to
say that the vast majority of the country has been subjected to a
52. Id. at 370 n.5.
53. Id. at 375–76; accord Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 376 (1987).
54. As noted above, some courts did not apply any doctrine at all; they merely conducted a
reasonableness balancing test. Some courts analogized these searches to border searches,
whereas other courts applied the doctrine of implied consent. See supra notes 29–31 and
accompanying text.
55. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 910 (9th Cir. 1973) (“In this and other
relevant respects, the airport search program is indistinguishable, for Fourth Amendment
purposes, from the warrantless screening inspection of air passengers and their luggage for plant
pests and disease . . . .”), abrogated by United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2007) (en
banc). Although the Supreme Court has never directly reviewed the constitutionality of
suspicionless searches at public buildings or in airports, it has cited the circuit court cases with
approval in dicta, implying that upholding these suspicionless searches is a proper application of
the administrative search doctrine. See Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S.
656, 675 n.3 (1989).
56. Davis, 482 F.2d at 910.
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search at an airport or a courthouse (or both). And in the second
place, the public safety purpose, although no doubt legitimate, does
not seem far removed from general crime control—in fact, if one
looks at the searches from a slightly different perspective, the purpose
seems to be indistinguishable from crime control.
As it turns out, the problem of distinguishing between public
safety and crime control became more severe over the next thirty
years, as two changes occurred. First, the administrative search
doctrine itself evolved to allow different types of searches, many of
which are de facto crime-control searches masquerading as
administrative searches. Second, as terrorism once again became a
real threat to the country, law enforcement officers sought to expand
the use of suspicionless antiterrorism searches to other contexts, and
the courts—unlike their predecessors in the early 1970s—began to
push back.
II. THE SECOND ERA: 1977–2000
Although the danger from terrorism receded from 1977 to 2000,
suspicionless antiterrorism searches continued—if anything, they
became more entrenched in the law and in the public consciousness.
At the same time, law enforcement began to use—and courts
approved of—suspicionless searches in a number of other contexts: in
schools, in the workplace, on probationers and parolees, and on the
public roads.
A. Order Is Restored
Over the following two-and-a-half decades, the threat of
terrorism—perceived and actual—receded from the nation’s
concerns. The major outbreaks of violence conducted by such groups
as the Weathermen, the Black Panthers, and Cuban exile groups
57
faded into history, whereas hijackings were virtually eliminated by
the end of the 1970s. But the suspicionless searches at airports and
most public buildings remained in place, finding a new practical (if
not doctrinal) justification in the minds of the populace and in the
courts. Given the relative period of calm, courts could no longer
57. There were some exceptions. The Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional (FALN), a
Puerto Rican Marxist terrorist group, carried out a number of bombings between 1974 and 1985.
None of these incidents, however, provoked a national shift in law enforcement tactics. See
Oscar Avila, Ex-Puerto Rican Radicals Work to Keep Cause Alive, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2009, at
A17.
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defend these suspicionless searches as extraordinary responses to an
“emergency” situation in which public buildings and airplanes faced
“imminent” danger from the “ruthless forces” bent on harming the
United States. Instead, the Supreme Court offered precisely the
opposite argument when it gave suspicionless airport searches its
stamp of approval (albeit in dicta) in 1989:
In the 15 years the [suspicionless search] program has been in
effect, more than 9.5 billion persons have been screened, and over
10 billion pieces of luggage have been inspected. By far the
overwhelming majority of those persons who have been
searched . . . have proved entirely innocent—only 42,000 firearms
have been detected during the same period. When the
Government’s interest lies in deterring highly hazardous conduct, a
low incidence of such conduct, far from impugning the validity of the
scheme for implementing this interest, is more logically viewed as a
58
hallmark of success.

There is little dispute that the hijacking epidemic ended in large
part because of the new security procedures at airports; thus, the
Court’s emphasis on the efficacy of such a program is entirely
sensible. No judge, commentator, or (probably) passenger would
have considered eliminating the searches even in the year 2000, after
59
a decade without any domestic passenger airplane hijackings. The
thought of eliminating them in the wake of the terrorist attacks in
2001 is practically unthinkable. Nevertheless, both the Fifth Circuit’s
sentiment that Americans all “look forward to the day when
skyjackings and their sequels, airport search and security measures,
60
cease” and the promise that the relaxed standards that allow
suspicionless airport searches will disappear “when the threat of air
61
piracy disappears” now seem naïve at best. It is now clear that the
“threat of air piracy” will never disappear, and thus, the security
measures will never disappear either. But if suspicionless searches at
airports are now a permanent fixture in American society, it is even
more imperative that courts find a principled justification for these
58. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 675 n.3 (citations omitted).
59. See OFFICE OF CIVIL AVIATION SEC., supra note 11, at 75. There was an attempted
hijacking of a nonpassenger airplane in 1994, when a Federal Express employee attempted to
hijack one of the company’s planes. See JEFFREY PRICE, PRACTICAL AVIATION SECURITY:
PREDICTING AND PREVENTING FUTURE THREATS 67 (2009).
60. United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272, 1279 (5th Cir. 1973).
61. Id.
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62

searches—and as we will see, the need to justify these searches has
been one of the factors that has turned the permissible suspicionless
search doctrine into a confusing tangle of inconsistent jurisprudence.
The policy of suspicionless searches at public buildings has also
long outlasted the violent epidemic of bombings and shootings that
created it. Like searches at airports, these security procedures have
become a familiar and unquestioned part of daily life; one simply
accepts that there is no way to enter many public buildings—to meet
with a public official, or to attend a session of open court—without
63
submitting to a search by a law enforcement official. But searches at
public buildings are different from those at airports in three
fundamental ways. First, although almost everyone traces the
decrease in hijackings to the suspicionless search policy that was
implemented to prevent them, the decrease in bombings and
shootings inside public buildings can probably be traced to a number
64
of different factors. Second, courts continue to point out that
suspicionless searches in airports are the only effective way to prevent
65
hijacking, whereas there may be other ways of keeping public
66
buildings and courtrooms safe. Finally, as the events of September
11, 2001 have shown, an airplane’s unique combination of
vulnerability and destructive power means that a hijacking could
potentially lead to catastrophic harm in terms of loss of life and
property. In short, although the two types of suspicionless searches
came into existence at the same time and were justified under similar
theories, there is, at least from a policy perspective, a much stronger

62. See infra Part III.
63. The unquestioned acceptance of these searches by the general population is perhaps
the most troubling aspect of permissible suspicionless searches. Not only does it mean that there
is no political will to change—or even critically examine—the policy of suspicionless searches at
airports and courthouses, but it could also ultimately mean that legally these procedures are no
longer even considered to be searches at all. Under the test put forward in Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347 (1967), a government surveillance or detection procedure is not a search unless it
violates the suspect’s “reasonable expectation of privacy.” Id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring). If
suspicionless searches at airports and courthouses are generally accepted by society, it could be
argued that they no longer violate a “reasonable expectation of privacy” because it would be
unreasonable to believe one had the right to board an airplane without being subjected to a
search. See Ric Simmons, From Katz to Kyllo: A Blueprint for Adapting the Fourth Amendment
to Twenty-First Century Technologies, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1303, 1331–35 (2002).
64. Most importantly, the decades since the Vietnam War have not seen anything like the
level of social unrest that was produced by the racial tensions and antiwar protests of that era.
See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
65. United States v. Marquez, 410 F.3d 612, 616 (9th Cir. 2005).
66. See infra note 355 and accompanying text.
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reason for continuing one kind of search than there is for the other.
Thus, a doctrine that permits suspicionless searches at airports need
not also cover suspicionless searches at public buildings.
B. Broadening the Scope of Permissible Suspicionless Searches
During this second era, the permissible suspicionless search
doctrine underwent an important evolution outside the context of
antiterrorism searches. Courts expanded the doctrine into a number
67
of different areas, including drug testing in schools, drug testing of
68
69
public employees, searches of probationers, and drunk-driving
70
checkpoints. But the most dramatic expansion in the law of
permissible suspicionless searches was a change in what it meant for a
search to have a noncriminal purpose—and this change occurred
subtly, perhaps accidentally, without any express acknowledgement
from the courts. As Part III demonstrates, this change had dramatic
implications for later courts who applied the permissible suspicionless
search doctrine in the terrorism context.
One example of this change in the suspicionless search doctrine
came in the administrative search context. In the 1987 case of New
71
York v. Burger, the Supreme Court upheld the suspicionless search
72
of an automobile junkyard. Under then-existing New York law,
every automobile junkyard had to keep records of all the auto parts
that came onto the premises, and submit both the records and the
junkyard itself to inspections whenever requested by an appropriate
73
state official. Pursuant to this law, police officers from the Auto
Crimes Division of the New York Police Department searched
Burger’s junkyard, copied down the vehicle identification numbers of
some auto parts there, and later determined that the parts had come
74
from stolen vehicles. Burger was subsequently charged and
convicted for possession of stolen property, and he appealed the

67. See infra Part II.B.1.
68. See infra Part II.B.2.
69. See infra Part II.B.3.
70. See infra Part II.B.4.
71. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
72. Id. at 718.
73. See N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 415-a5 (McKinney 1986). The law allowed inspection by
an agent of the Department of Motor Vehicles or by a police officer. Id.
74. Burger, 482 U.S. at 694–95.
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conviction, claiming that the lack of individualized suspicion rendered
the search unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court applied the administrative search doctrine
and ruled that the search was not “aimed at the discovery of a
crime”—even though it was conducted by police officers and resulted
75
in a criminal prosecution. The Court explained that “an
administrative scheme may have the same ultimate purpose as penal
laws, even if its regulatory goals are narrower;” and that this
particular administrative scheme “serves the regulatory goals of
seeking to ensure that vehicle dismantlers are legitimate
businesspersons and that stolen vehicles and vehicle parts passing
76
through automobile junkyards can be identified.”
During this same period, the Supreme Court began to approve of
suspicionless searches in other contexts, and in each context the
Court moved toward a weakening of the “noncriminal purpose”
requirement. Specifically, the Court approved of four new categories
of suspicionless searches: drug tests in public schools, drug tests of
public employees, searches of probationers and parolees, and
vehicular checkpoints. In broadening the scope of suspicionless
searches, the Court refined its terminology, moving from
“administrative search” to the broader term of “special needs
search.”
1. The Birth of Special Needs: Searches and Drug Tests in
Schools. The term special needs was first coined in New Jersey v.
77
T.L.O., in which a high school assistant principal searched the purse
78
of a student whom he suspected of smoking in school. Although the
principal had neither a warrant nor probable cause, the Court upheld
the search for two reasons: first, the search was conducted for the
purpose of “maintaining discipline in the classroom and on school
79
grounds,” not law enforcement purposes; and second, high school
students have a “lesser expectation of privacy” than the general
75. In applying the administrative search doctrine, the Supreme Court found that the
defendant had a reduced expectation of privacy because he was in a closely regulated industry,
id. at 703–07, and because suspicionless searches were necessary to further a substantial interest
of the state, id. at 708–10. The Court also noted that the statute provided notice, which was a
valid substitute for a warrant, and that it placed legitimate time, place, and scope restrictions on
the searches. Id. at 711–12.
76. Id. at 713–14 (emphasis added).
77. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
78. Id. at 336.
79. Id. at 339.
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80

population. In his concurrence, Justice Blackmun set out a test that
would be used in future cases: a lower standard for searches was
permitted “only in those exceptional circumstances in which special
needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the
81
warrant and probable cause requirement impracticable.”
In contrast with the administrative search cases, the special needs
test does not involve any explicit finding that the government
possessed no other viable means of meeting its objective. Blackmun’s
test, however, incorporates (and dilutes) this standard by stating that
the traditional requirements of the Fourth Amendment can only be
loosened if the special needs make adherence to those requirements
82
“impracticable.” In the context of a search conducted by school
officials, the majority in T.L.O. stated that “[t]he warrant
requirement . . . is unsuited to the school environment” because it
“would unduly interfere with the maintenance of the swift and
83
informal disciplinary procedures needed in the schools.”
This first special needs case was not a suspicionless search
because the assistant principal had some reason to believe the
defendant was carrying contraband in her purse. Thus, the special
needs doctrine initially only meant that a court would relax the strict
warrant and probable cause requirements if there were special needs
84
beyond the normal needs of law enforcement. In T.L.O., for
example, the Court held that the school officials must have
“reasonable grounds” to believe the student had broken a law or a
85
school rule.
But this requirement of individualized suspicion for searches of
public school students was abandoned ten years later in Vernonia v.
86
Acton, in which the Court upheld mandatory, suspicionless drug

80. Id. at 348 (Powell, J., concurring).
81. Id. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
82. See id. at 340 (majority opinion) (“The warrant requirement, in particular, is unsuited
to the school environment: requiring a teacher to obtain a warrant before searching a child
suspected of an infraction of school rules (or of the criminal law) would unduly interfere with
the maintenance of the swift and informal disciplinary procedures needed in the schools.”).
83. Id.
84. See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995); Griffin v.
Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987).
85. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341–42.
86. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
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87

testing of school athletes. As in T.L.O., the Court in Acton
emphasized that schoolchildren had a “lesser expectation of
88
privacy.” And the Court found other factors—not present in
T.L.O.—which would logically lead to a further loosening of the
Fourth Amendment standards: athletes in particular have a lower
89
expectation of privacy than other students; a urinalysis is in some
90
ways more limited and less intrusive than the search of a purse; the
results of the tests were revealed only to school administrators and
91
parents, not to law enforcement; and alternate methods of deterring
92
drug use were likely to be less effective. Unfortunately, the Court
did not explain which of these factors justified the critical doctrinal
shift from T.L.O.’s requirement of “reasonable grounds” to Acton’s
93
abandonment of individualized suspicion.
At first glance, abandoning the requirement of individualized
suspicion was the most significant part of the Acton opinion. But as
this Article demonstrates, suspicionless searches had already been
allowed in the context of administrative searches, so this was not an
94
unprecedented step. In truth, the most significant aspect of Acton
was the specific special need that the Court used to justify deviation
from the strict Fourth Amendment requirements in the first place.
Unlike the special need in T.L.O. (maintaining discipline in the
classroom and on school grounds), Acton’s special need was barely
distinguishable from a standard law enforcement purpose:
95
“[d]eterring drug use by our Nation’s schoolchildren.”
In the Acton case, however, the Court could still legitimately
claim that the test was not designed to serve the ordinary needs of law
enforcement because the results of the test were not turned over to
96
law enforcement personnel. Since Acton, this expansive definition of
87. Id. at 663–64.
88. Id. at 655–57.
89. See id. at 657.
90. See id. at 658.
91. Id. at 651, 658.
92. See id. at 663–64.
93. One can conclude by inference that the “reduced expectation of privacy” of athletes
was not one of the dispositive factors, because seven years later the Court approved
suspicionless drug testing of all students involved in extracurricular activities. See Bd. of Educ. v.
Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 825 (2002).
94. Suspicionless searches had also already been permitted in the context of automotive
checkpoints. See infra notes 139–46 and accompanying text.
95. Acton, 515 U.S. at 661.
96. Id. at 658.
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special needs has broadened to other cases in which the results of the
97
search are turned over to law enforcement, thus effectively removing
the original justification for departing from the Fourth Amendment’s
traditional requirement of individualized suspicion.
2. Searches and Drug Tests of Public Employees. Only one year
after T.L.O. was decided, a plurality of the Court applied the special
98
needs test in O’Connor v. Ortega, in effect upholding a search of a
99
public hospital employee’s desk. As in T.L.O., the reason underlying
the intrusion was not the normal need of law enforcement, but rather
“the government’s need for supervision, control, and the efficient
100
operation of the workplace;” thus, the search was not impermissible
even though there was no warrant and no probable cause.
Ortega’s analysis was similar to T.L.O.’s in many ways. The
Court stated that a warrant or probable cause requirement would be
impracticable in the context of the public workplace because the
supervisors who conduct these searches—like school administrators—
“are hardly in the business of investigating the violation of criminal
laws,” and therefore could not be expected to understand or comply
101
with “unwieldy warrant procedures” or “the subtleties of the
102
probable cause standard.” Also, just like the schoolchildren in
T.L.O. and the heavily regulated businesses in Camara, the Court
noted that office workers have a diminished expectation of privacy in

97. See infra notes 147–50 and accompanying text.
98. O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
99. Cf. id. at 722 (“In our view, requiring an employer to obtain a warrant whenever the
employer wished to enter an employee’s office, desk, or file cabinets for a work-related purpose
would seriously disrupt the routine conduct of business and would be unduly burdensome.
Imposing unwieldy warrant procedures in such cases upon supervisors, who would otherwise
have no reason to be familiar with such procedures, is simply unreasonable.”).
100. Id. at 720; see also id. at 723 (“Government agencies provide myriad services to the
public, and the work of these agencies would suffer if employers were required to have probable
cause before they entered an employee’s desk for the purpose of finding a file or piece of office
correspondence. Indeed, it is difficult to give the concept of probable cause, rooted as it is in the
criminal investigatory context, much meaning when the purpose of a search is to retrieve a file
for work-related reasons. Similarly, the concept of probable cause has little meaning for a
routine inventory conducted by public employers for the purpose of securing state property. To
ensure the efficient and proper operation of the agency, therefore, public employers must be
given wide latitude to enter employee offices for work-related, noninvestigatory reasons.”
(citations omitted)).
101. Id. at 722.
102. Id. at 724–25.
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103

their workplace. And unsurprisingly, the Court ordered the district
court to apply the same standard to evaluate the search: whether the
government had “reasonable grounds” to suspect that the search
104
would turn up evidence of wrongdoing.
And like T.L.O., Ortega laid the groundwork for future cases in
which the Court abandoned the individualized suspicion requirement
for public employees. In a pair of cases in 1989, the Court upheld
suspicionless mandatory drug tests for railroad employees who had
105
been involved in accidents and customs agents who used firearms or
106
engaged in drug interdiction.
In Skinner v. Railway Labor
107
Executives’ Ass’n, the Court determined that the purpose of drug
tests for railroad employees was “ensuring the safety of the traveling
108
public and of the employees themselves,” noting that the tests were
administered “not to assist in the prosecution of employees, but
rather to prevent accidents and casualties in railroad operations that
109
result from impairment of employees by alcohol or drugs.” In
110
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, the Court held
that the purpose of drug tests for United States Customs agents was
“to deter drug use among those eligible for promotion to sensitive
positions within the [Customs] Service and to prevent the promotion
111
of drug users to those positions.” Specifically, the Court noted that
the Customs Service sought to prevent employees with guns from
injuring themselves or others, and to ensure that those protecting the
nation’s borders maintained good judgment and were not vulnerable
112
to blackmail.
In both Skinner and Von Raab, the Court cited the familiar
justifications for allowing suspicionless searches: a limited intrusion

103. Id. at 717 (“An office is seldom a private enclave free from entry by supervisors, other
employees, and business and personal invitees. Instead, in many cases offices are continually
entered by fellow employees and other visitors during the workday for conferences,
consultations, and other work-related visits. Simply put, it is the nature of government offices
that others—such as fellow employees, supervisors, consensual visitors, and the general public—
may have frequent access to an individual’s office.”).
104. Id. at 726.
105. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 606 (1989).
106. Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 660–61 (1989).
107. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
108. Id. at 621.
109. Id. at 620–21 (internal quotation marks omitted).
110. Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
111. Id. at 666.
112. See id. at 670–71.
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113

on privacy, reduced expectation of privacy on the part of the
114
subjects, and the fact that imposing a warrant requirement would be
115
impractical and would frustrate the government purpose. But most
significantly, Skinner and Von Raab paralleled the evolution of
special needs that would later be seen in Acton: in both Skinner and
Von Raab, the purpose of the drug test was essentially to deter illegal
activity (drug use), with the dubious argument that deterring illegal
activity went beyond the standard goals of law enforcement because
of the highly dangerous or sensitive positions that the employees
116
occupied. As with Acton, the Court in Skinner and Von Raab could
credibly claim that the test was not meant to serve the ordinary goals
of law enforcement because the results of the drug tests were not
117
turned over to the police —but as in Acton, the Court did not
expressly state that this restraint on the part of the state was a
necessary element in determining that the search was conducted for a
special need.
3. Searches of Probationers and Parolees. In the same year that
118
Ortega was decided, the Court in Griffin v. Wisconsin found a
119
special need justifying the search of a probationer’s home. Again,
the search was conducted without a warrant or probable cause, and
again, the Court upheld the search for two reasons: first, because of
the lower level of Fourth Amendment protection due to
113. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 672 n.2.
114. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 627 (finding a diminished expectation of privacy due to the
heavy regulation of the industry); Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 672 (ruling that customs agents should
expect inquiries into their fitness to perform their job).
115. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 623–24, 628 (noting that drug users sometimes show no
outward signs giving rise to probable cause; further noting that private railway employers are
not experts in the warrant requirements or the subtleties of the law on probable cause); Von
Raab, 489 U.S. at 666–67 (holding that a warrant requirement would “divert valuable agency
resources from the Service’s primary mission”).
116. The greater danger posed regarding drug use by schoolchildren, railway operators, and
customs agents is an important factor: a few years later, the Court found there was no special
need to justify a Georgia law that required drug testing of all candidates for elected office
because the officials did not “perform high risk, safety-sensitive tasks.” Chandler v. Miller, 520
U.S. 305, 321–22 (1997).
117. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 621 n.5 (noting that although the results of the test could be
turned over to law enforcement, there was no evidence that the public employer had ever done
so, nor that it ever intended to do so); Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 666 (“Test results may not be used
in a criminal prosecution of the employee without the employee’s consent.”).
118. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987).
119. Id. at 872–74.
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120

probationers; and second, because the goal of the search was not
law enforcement, but instead ensuring “that the probation serves as a
period of genuine rehabilitation and that the community is not
121
harmed by the probationer’s being at large.”
And what of the third factor cited in previous special needs
cases—that requiring individualized suspicion was infeasible? In past
special needs cases such as T.L.O. and Ortega, the Court relied on
this factor, noting that it was impracticable for teachers, school
administrators, or public agency supervisors to learn and understand
122
the complexities of the warrant requirement and probable cause.
But in Griffin, this factor was whittled down more or less into
oblivion because there is no real argument that probation officers
cannot understand and apply the warrant or probable cause
standards. The best the Court could do was to explain that the
government interest might be “unduly disrupted by a requirement of
123
probable cause,” because “so long as [the probationer’s] illegal (and
perhaps socially dangerous) activities were sufficiently concealed as
to give rise to no more than reasonable suspicion, they would go
124
undetected and uncorrected.” This statement is equally true in the
traditional law enforcement context; thus, it provides no extra
ammunition for the argument that a lesser Fourth Amendment
125
standard should apply.
The Griffin Court required the government to show “reasonable
grounds” before searching a probationer’s home, but as with public
schoolchildren and public employees, the Court eventually began
allowing these searches without any showing of individualized
126
suspicion at all. As this shift occurred, however, searches of

120. See id. at 874 (noting that probationers and parolees “do not enjoy ‘the absolute liberty
to which every citizen is entitled, but only . . . conditional liberty properly dependent on
observance of special [probation] restrictions’” (alterations in original) (quoting Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972))).
121. Id. at 875.
122. See O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 720, 722 (1987); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S.
325, 352–53 (1985).
123. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 878.
124. Id.
125. The Griffin Court also added another consideration, unique to the probationer context:
that the ongoing, supervisory relationship between the probation officer and the probationer
would provide extra information to the probation officer in deciding whether to conduct a
search. Id. at 879.
126. The latest product of this evolution is Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006),
discussed infra at note 133.
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probationers and parolees slowly left the orbit of the special needs
category. A series of circuit court cases in the early 2000s focused on
mandatory DNA extraction from prison inmates, parolees, and
probationers, and these cases made it clear that the primary
consideration in analyzing these searches was the subjects’
dramatically reduced expectation of privacy rather than the purpose
of the search. Numerous circuits struggled to find a way to
characterize the purpose of taking DNA samples as a “special need
127
beyond the normal need for law enforcement,” which turned out to
be a logically impossible task because the DNA database being
assembled was used for traditional law enforcement purposes. Other
circuits abandoned the special needs test altogether and simply
applied a “totality of the circumstances” test, allowing the DNA
extraction because of the subjects’ substantially diminished
128
expectation of privacy.
Finally, in 2001 the Supreme Court itself abandoned the special
needs requirement for searches of probationers in United States v.
129
Knights. At issue was a probationary condition that allowed the
130
authorities to search the probationer’s home at any time. The Court
acknowledged that the breadth of the probationary condition meant
that a search could be conducted for any purpose, including a law
131
enforcement purpose, and so the special needs doctrine could not
justify the condition. The Court cited Griffin, however, for the
proposition that a probationer’s expectation of privacy was very

127. Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 671 (2d Cir. 2005); see also id. at 669 (upholding DNA
collection from certain convicted felons because “[a]lthough the DNA samples may eventually
help law enforcement identify the perpetrator of a crime,” they are not being used for evidence
or investigations “at the time of collection”), overruled in part by Samson, 547 U.S. 843, as stated
in United States v. Amerson, 483 F.3d 73, 79 n.5 (2007); Green v. Berge, 354 F.3d 675, 677, 679
(7th Cir. 2004) (upholding DNA collection from prisoners because “the government has a
special need in obtaining identity DNA samples”).
128. See, e.g., United States v. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175, 184 (3d Cir. 2005) (upholding DNA
sample of probationers as a reasonable search under the totality of the circumstances); Padgett
v. Donald, 401 F.3d 1273, 1280 (11th Cir. 2005) (same for prisoners); Groceman v. Dep’t of
Justice, 354 F.3d 411, 413 (5th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (probationers); United States v. Kincade,
379 F.3d 813, 839 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (prisoners); Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 307 (4th
Cir. 1992) (same).
129. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001).
130. Id. at 114.
131. Id. at 116.
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132

and thus the search was reasonable, given the strong
low,
133
government interest in monitoring its probationers.
4. Vehicular Checkpoints. Suspicionless stops at vehicular
checkpoints have a long history. Even before the special needs
doctrine was articulated in T.L.O., the Court had extended the
134
administrative search doctrine of Camara into the automotive
checkpoint context.
The first automotive checkpoint cases involved immigration
stops. As noted above, the legal authority to conduct these stops at
135
the border has been well established for nearly one hundred years.
Similarly, international mail is subject to suspicionless searches by
136
customs officials, and even files on laptop computers can be opened
137
and read during customs searches without individualized suspicion.
As a circuit court explained, border searches are conducted “for the
purposes of collecting duties and intercepting contraband destined for
138
the interior of the United States.”
After Camara in 1967, however, the Court began to use the
administrative search doctrine to expand the scope of border searches
to include seizures that were nowhere near the border. In 1975, the
Court stated that the warrant and probable cause requirement did not
139
apply to roving patrols inside the border. One year later, in United
140
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, the Court upheld the constitutionality of a
suspicionless immigration checkpoint that took place nearly sixty
141
miles inside the border. The Court relied on Camara and its
progeny for the principle that, although “individualized suspicion is
usually a prerequisite to a constitutional search or seizure . . . . the

132. Id. at 119.
133. Id. at 120–21. In a case five years later, the Court similarly ignored the special needs
test in upholding a California law that allowed parolees to be subject to suspicionless searches.
Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 846, 855 n.4 (2006).
134. See supra notes 40–43 and accompanying text.
135. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
136. See, e.g., United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 622 (1977); United States v. Seljan, 547
F.3d 993, 1008 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
137. United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003, 1008 (9th Cir. 2008).
138. United States v. Robles, 45 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1995).
139. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 883 (1975) (stating in dictum that law
enforcement officers in border areas could pull over cars based on less than probable cause, but
stating that there must be some individualized reasonable suspicion).
140. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
141. Id. at 566–67.
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Fourth Amendment imposes no irreducible requirement of such
142
suspicion.”
The Court justified the lower Fourth Amendment standard on
numerous grounds. One was the low level of intrusion involved in the
stop—a brief detention, a few questions, the production of
143
documents, and a visual inspection of the car. Another justification
was the diminished expectation of privacy possessed by individuals in
144
automobiles. But these rationales alone were not sufficient to justify
suspicionless stops, so in an attempt to tie the automotive checkpoint
cases to the administrative search doctrine, the Court also
emphasized two other aspects of the case: the necessity of these
techniques to prevent the influx of illegal aliens (a flow that “cannot
145
be controlled effectively at the border”);
and a non–law
enforcement purpose, which it described as the public interest in
146
denying illegal aliens “a quick and safe route into the interior.”
The Court later upheld vehicular checkpoints for the purposes of
detecting and apprehending drunk drivers. In that case, Michigan
147
Department of State Police v. Sitz, the Court rejected the special
needs test and instead applied a balancing test from other seizure
148
cases. Because the danger posed to public safety by drunk drivers
was so great, and the intrusion on Fourth Amendment rights by the
stops was so slight, the Court concluded that the checkpoints were
149
reasonable.
As with the suspicionless searches in Burger, Skinner, Von Raab,
and Acton, there is a fine line between vehicular checkpoints
designed for general crime control and those designed to meet a
special need or a distinct public interest. By the year 2000, the
suspicionless search doctrine had evolved from covering a narrowly
defined group of cases involving truly routine and administrative
procedures to covering a wide range of searches that revealed
142. Id. at 560–61.
143. Id. at 558.
144. Id. at 561; see also United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12 (1977) (claiming a
“diminished expectation of privacy” with regard to vehicles).
145. Martinez-Fuente, 428 U.S. at 556.
146. Id. at 557.
147. Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
148. Id. at 455. The Court relied most prominently on Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979).
See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 448–50, 453–54.
149. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 449–52.

SIMMONS IN FINAL.DOC

2010]

1/5/2010 2:12:49 AM

SEARCHING FOR TERRORISTS

873

evidence of criminal activity—though the doctrine’s approval rested
on whether the purpose of the search was something other than
150
detecting criminal activity. As a result, by the end of the second era,
antiterrorism suspicionless searches at airports and courthouses no
longer seemed out of place as an administrative or special needs
search—the doctrine had effectively caught up with the reality of
antiterrorism searches.
But in this final period, during the second wave of terrorist
attacks, the government began overstepping its bounds, and courts
began to resist applying the special needs doctrine to suspicionless
antiterrorism searches. At the same time, the Supreme Court began
to limit the application of the special needs doctrine in other contexts,
further complicating the doctrinal justification for antiterrorist
searches.
III. THE THIRD ERA: 2001–2010
The fight against terrorism has been one of the defining
characteristics of this decade. In response to the devastating attacks of
September 11 and subsequent attacks in Europe, the United States
government instituted a number of aggressive law enforcement
initiatives to prevent future terrorist attacks. Among these initiatives
was a sweeping expansion of antiterrorism suspicionless searches,
which were instituted near potential terrorist targets such as
reservoirs, political protests, sports arenas, and public transportation.
At the same time, however, courts finally began to limit and restrict
the use of suspicionless searches, both inside and outside the context
of terrorism.
A. The War on Terror
The attacks of September 11, 2001 killed nearly 3,000 Americans
151
in a single day. They were followed by similar attacks on civilians
throughout Europe, including the 2004 bombing of four commuter
trains in Madrid, which killed 191 people and injured nearly 2,000

150. In fact, the antiterrorism searches provided some authority for this shift because a
number of cases that expanded the scope of suspicionless searches cited the earlier courts’
unanimous approval of airport and courthouse searches as evidence that public safety was a
legitimate special need, distinct from general crime control. See, e.g., Nat’l Treasury Employees
Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 675 n.3 (1989).
151. Sean Alfano, War Casualties Pass 9/11 Death Toll, CBS NEWS, Sept. 22, 2006,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/09/22/terror/main2035427.shtml.
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152

more, and the 2005 bombing of three subway trains in London,
153
which killed 52 people and injured over 700.
The threat of terrorist attacks, and the resulting “war on terror,”
154
have been two of the defining characteristics of this decade. Unlike
the late 1960s, when the country faced hundreds of small-scale acts of
violence as a result of widespread social unrest, the war on terror in
the 2000s is primarily defined by the devastating attacks on a single
155
day in 2001. But the popular sentiment and the government reaction
has otherwise been similar, and just like in the early 1970s, the
government has responded to the terrorist threat with aggressive law
enforcement techniques, many of which have restricted civil
156
liberties. The most dramatic responses—the USA PATRIOT Act,
indefinite detention at Guantánamo Bay, warrantless wiretapping,
and enhanced interrogation techniques—have been subject to
157
significant public criticism, and most have subsequently been
repudiated by the Supreme Court or reversed by the Obama
158
administration.

152. Sean Clarke, Major Terrorist Attacks Since 9/11, GUARDIAN, Jul. 7, 2005, http://www.
guardian.co.uk/world/2005/jul/07/terrorism.uk1.
153. Attack on London, GUARDIAN, July 7, 2005, http://www.guardian.co.uk/flash/0,,15388
19,00.html.
154. Terrorism did not even register as an election issue in 2000, but in 2002 it was seen as
the second-most important challenge for the government to address. See Economy Now the
Most Important Issue for Americans by a Wide Margin, HARRIS INTERACTIVE, Sept. 24, 2008,
http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harris_poll/index.asp?PID=951 (showing that, of people
surveyed in 2002, 17 percent offered unprompted replies of “terrorism” as an election issue,
making it the second most common unprompted answer).
155. There have been a series of threats and even fatalities since then, such as an individual
who attempted to board a passenger airplane with a bomb in his shoe, see Shoe Bomb Suspect to
Remain in Custody, CNN.COM, Dec. 25, 2001, http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/12/24/
investigation.plane/index.html, and an unidentified person who sent Anthrax through the mail,
see FBI, Amerithrax Investigation, http://www.fbi.gov/anthrax/amerithraxlinks.htm (last visited
Jan. 3, 2010).
156. For an overview and analysis of many of these responses, see Parry, supra note 3, at
770–82.
157. See, e.g., Cate Doty, Gore Criticizes Expanded Terrorism Law, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10,
2003, at A1 (criticizing expanded security measures).
158. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 635 (2006) (ruling that the Bush
administration’s tribunals trying enemy combatants held at Guantánamo Bay were
unconstitutional); Scott Shane, Mark Mazzetti & Helene Cooper, Obama Reverses Key Bush
Security Policies, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2009, at A1 (“Mr. Obama signed executive orders closing
the detention camp at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, within a year; ending the Central Intelligence
Agency’s secret prisons; and requiring all interrogations to follow the noncoercive methods of
the Army Field Manual.”).
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One of the less publicized reactions to this second wave of
terrorism has been local law enforcement’s increasing use of
suspicionless searches in new contexts. Local police have conducted
159
160
suspicionless searches at subway entrances, on ferries, near the
161
162
Republican and Democratic conventions, near reservoirs, at
163
164
165
protest rallies, at hockey arenas, and at football stadiums. Courts
have analogized these cases to the suspicionless antiterrorism
searches from the past era, applying the administrative search
doctrine to determine whether the search was permissible. But unlike
the searches in airports and public buildings that comprised the first
wave of antiterrorism suspicionless searches, these searches have not
been met with unanimous approval by the courts.
1. Reservoirs.
The opening act in this second stage of
antiterrorism searches occurred one month after the September 11
attacks, in the middle of the night on a small country road near the
166
Cobble Mountain Reservoir in Blandville, Massachusetts. The
Cobble Mountain Reservoir supplies water to a number of towns and
cities in Massachusetts, and in the wake of the September 11 attacks,
the state police were concerned that a terrorist might try to
167
contaminate the water supply or destroy the dam itself. Troopers
were stationed on the Cobble Mountain Road, which runs along the
length of the reservoir, with orders to stop all vehicles that travelled
168
along the road and speak to the drivers.
The officers stopped David Carkhuff and immediately noticed
that he was intoxicated, and then arrested him for driving under the
169
influence. Carkhuff challenged the constitutionality of the stop,

159. See infra Part III.A.4.
160. See infra Part III.A.4.
161. See infra Part III.A.2.
162. Commonwealth v. Carkhuff, 804 N.E.2d 317, 318 (Mass. 2004); see also infra Part
III.A.1.
163. Bourgeois v. Peters, 387 F.3d 1303, 1306 (11th Cir. 2004); see also infra Part III.A.2.
164. State v. Seglen, 700 N.W.2d 702, 705 (N.D. 2005); see also infra Part III.A.3.
165. Johnston v. Tampa Sports Auth., 442 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1259–60 (M.D. Fla. 2006), rev’d
per curiam, 490 F.3d 820 (11th Cir. 2007), vacated and superseded on reh’g, 530 F.3d 1320 (11th
Cir. 2008) (per curiam); see also infra Part III.A.3.
166. Carkhuff, 804 N.E.2d at 318.
167. Id. at 318–19.
168. Id. The troopers also had orders to conduct a search of every truck that drove down the
road. Id.
169. Id. at 319.
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noting that the troopers had no reason to suspect him of having
170
committed any crime at the time he was ordered to stop. The state
urged the court to apply the special needs doctrine, arguing that the
troopers’ policy of suspicionless stops was analogous to the well171
established searches at airports and public buildings. As the state
noted, “the search and seizure protocols at those facilities,” like the
seizure protocol near the reservoir, are not designed for a law
enforcement purpose, but rather “to assure that persons entering do
not have the means to destroy those facilities or to disrupt their
172
operation.”
But the Massachusetts Supreme Court disagreed. The court held
that the purpose of the search crossed the line from protecting public
safety to straightforward law enforcement, and thus the state
troopers’ actions did not meet the requirements of an administrative
173
search. The court based this conclusion on the lack of notice given
to the defendant, noting that in the case of searches at airports and
public buildings, the individual receives prior notice that the search
174
will occur. This allows the individual to avoid the search altogether
175
by “electing not to board the aircraft (or enter the court house).”
Giving prior notice reinforces the argument that the purpose of the
search is to protect the vulnerable facility rather than to detect and
apprehend criminals because “the objective of preventing dangerous
persons from gaining access is still accomplished” if a terrorist simply
176
avoids the facility altogether.
2. Political Protests. One year after Carkhuff was illegally
searched near the Cobble Mountain Resevoir, another antiterrorism
suspicionless search took place outside a military base in Columbus,
Georgia. A protest group was planning its annual demonstration
177
outside of Fort Benning, and the city of Columbus instituted a new
170. Id. at 318.
171. Id. at 320.
172. Id. The state also used analogies to cases upholding searches at the entrances to
military bases. See, e.g., United States v. Miles, 480 F.2d 1217, 1219 (9th Cir. 1973) (per curiam).
173. Carkhuff, 804 N.E.2d at 320.
174. Id. at 322–23.
175. Id. at 322.
176. Id. at 323.
177. Bourgeois v. Peters, 387 F.3d 1303, 1306 (11th Cir. 2004). Fort Benning was the host of
the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation, otherwise known as the “School of
the Americas,” which trains military leaders from other Western Hemisphere countries in
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policy requiring every participant in the protest to submit to a search
178
prior to proceeding to the protest site. The city argued in its brief
that the September 11 attacks had—or at least should have—
fundamentally changed the rules for antiterrorism suspicionless
searches, stating that “[l]ocal governments need an opinion that,
without question, allows [suspicionless] non-discriminatory, low-level
179
magnetometer searches at large gatherings.”
The Eleventh Circuit refused to give the city such an opinion. In
180
Bourgeois v. Peters, the court found the city’s argument “troubling”
because “the threat of terrorism . . . cannot [be] use[d] . . . as the basis
for restricting the scope of the Fourth Amendment’s protections in
181
any large gathering of people.” If a generalized threat of terrorism
were sufficient to justify mass suspicionless searches, law enforcement
could institute these searches for any large event, including “a high
school graduation, a church picnic, a public concert in the park, an art
festival, a Fourth of July parade, sporting events such as a marathon,
182
and fund-raising events such as the annual breast cancer walk.”
Like the state of Massachusetts, the city of Columbus invoked
the special needs doctrine, arguing that the purpose of searching the
protesters was not to detect crime or enforce the criminal law, but
instead to “ensure the safety of participants, spectators, and law
183
enforcement.” The Bourgeois court rejected this argument, ruling
that the goals of public safety and law enforcement were “inextricably
184
intertwined” in this context. The difference is no more than
semantic, according to the court; under the city’s argument, “a search
intended to enforce a given law would be permissible so long as the
government officially maintained that its purpose was to secure the

counterinsurgency tactics. Id. The protest group, known as the School of the Americas Watch
(SAW), had conducted a peaceful protest of approximately 15,000 people every year for the
thirteen years prior to the events in this case. Id.
178. The search was essentially identical to an airport screening—every protester was
required to walk through a metal detector, and if the detector indicated the presence of metal,
the police would conduct a more thorough search of the protestor’s person and possessions. Id.
at 1307.
179. Id. at 1311 (quoting Brief of Appellees at 13, Bourgeois, 387 F.3d 1303 (No. 02-16886),
2003 WL 23960109).
180. Bourgeois v. Peters, 387 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2004).
181. Id. at 1311.
182. Id. (quoting Reply Brief of Appellants at 4, Bourgeois, 387 F.3d 1303 (No. 02-16886),
2003 WL 23960108).
183. Id. at 1312 (quoting Brief of Appellees, supra note 179, at 11).
184. Id. at 1312–13.
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objectives that motivated the law’s enactment in the first place (e.g.,
public safety) rather than simply to enforce the law for its own
185
sake.”
But the Bourgeois court did not explain why this argument
should apply to searches at political protests and not to searches at
airports and public buildings, which are also searches intended to
detect criminal activity that are justified on the grounds that they
protect public safety. Indeed, the Bourgeois court—somewhat
inexplicably—does not mention the airport and public buildings cases
at all. Thus, the court does not provide any principled way to
distinguish between antiterrorism suspicionless searches at airports
and public buildings (which courts have consistently held to be
permissible) and antiterrorism suspicionless searches at political
186
protests (which the court held were impermissible).
Two years later, in preparation for the Republican National
Convention of 2004, New York City attempted to institute its own
suspicionless search policy for political protesters. To enhance
security during the convention, the New York City Police
Department (N.Y.P.D.) planned to search the bags of every protestor
187
before allowing them to proceed to the demonstration site. In
188
Stauber v. City of New York, the protestors challenged this policy
and sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the police from
189
conducting these searches. Once again, the defendant invoked the
special needs doctrine, citing the cases upholding suspicionless
190
searches at airports. And once again, the court rejected this
191
argument.
But unlike the Bourgeois court, the judge in Stauber addressed
the airport cases directly, and distinguished them from searches at
185. Id. at 1313.
186. The Bourgeois court did note in the facts that the demonstrations had been peaceful for
thirteen years, with no weapons ever found and no arrests for violence, id. at 1306, but it did not
refer back to these facts during its legal analysis.
187. Stauber v. City of New York, Nos. 03 Civ. 9162, 03 Civ. 9163, 03 Civ. 9164, 2004 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 13350, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 2004). The N.Y.P.D. also announced a number of
other security measures, such as requiring demonstrators to assemble within “pens” that were
made up of metal barricades and restricting access to the sites of the demonstration. Id. at *2–3.
188. Stauber v. City of New York, Nos. 03 Civ. 9162, 03 Civ. 9163, 03 Civ. 9164, 2004 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 13350 (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 2004).
189. Id. at *1.
190. Id. at *84–87.
191. Id. at *84–90.
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protest sites. According to the court, the primary difference between
the two cases was the nature of the security threat: for the New York
City protestors, the threat was “overly vague”: the defendant had
only shown that the United States government “considers the
192
Convention to be a potential terrorism target,” and a “general
invocation of terrorist threats” was not sufficient to justify the search
193
program. In contrast, searches at airports were “implemented in
response to specific information about the threats faced by
194
officials;”
thus, the threat was real and concrete, and law
195
enforcement was allowed to respond accordingly.
3. Sports Arenas. A year earlier, the issue of suspicionless
antiterrorism searches arose in yet another context: a college hockey
game between the University of North Dakota and the University of
196
Minnesota in Grand Forks, North Dakota. For security reasons,
University police officers at the entrances to the game subjected
197
every student to a pat-down search before entering the arena. When
the police searched Scott Seglen, an underage student, they detected
198
and recovered a can of Coors Light in his pocket. Seglen challenged
the constitutionality of the search, and the state analogized the search
to suspicionless searches at airports and public buildings, arguing that
such searches were even more reasonable in the wake of the attacks
199
of September 11.
The North Dakota Supreme Court also rejected this analogy,
citing Bourgeois, and held that the suspicionless searches were
200
unconstitutional.
Unlike the Eleventh Circuit in Bourgeois,

192. Id. at *88.
193. Id. at *89.
194. Id. at *88–89.
195. The court also noted other significant differences between airport searches and
protestor searches: (1) the searches at airports involve (as a first step) only metal detectors,
which are less intrusive than bag searches; (2) airport searches do not affect a person’s
constitutional right to expression; and (3) the police department gives no advance notice as to
whether they will be searching at a particular demonstration. Id. at *84–88.
196. State v. Seglen, 700 N.W.2d 702 (N.D. 2005).
197. Id. at 705. One of the original justifications for the search was to prevent students from
carrying animal carcasses into the arena and then throwing them on the ice during the game. Id.
at 705. During the court case, however, the state argued for broader “security needs” that are
“similar to airports and courthouses, especially in recent years.” Id. at 707.
198. Id. at 705.
199. Id. at 707–08.
200. Id. at 708.
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201

however, the court in State v. Seglen did provide one hint as to why
searches at hockey arenas should be treated differently than searches
at airports and public buildings—and its reasoning was similar to that
of the judge in Stauber. The court noted that airport and public
building searches were held to be constitutional only after
“unprecedented airport bombings, aircraft piracy, and courtroom
202
violence;” in contrast, there was “no history of injury or violence
203
presented” in the Seglen case. Whether a history of injury and
violence at sports arenas would actually have changed the outcome of
the case—and if so, what level of history of injury and violence would
be required—was left unexplained.
The next court to hear a suspicionless search case at a sporting
event was even more explicit in its reasoning. In Johnston v. Tampa
204
Sports Authority,
a federal district court judge ruled that
suspicionless searches of fans entering a professional football stadium
were unconstitutional. The court applied a special needs analysis, and
(unlike the Eleventh Circuit in Bourgeois), did not dispute the fact
that ensuring public safety could be a special need distinct from law
205
enforcement purposes. But the court then followed the reasoning of
the Stauber court, explicitly stating that for an antiterrorism
suspicionless search to be constitutional, the danger of a terrorist
attack must be a “concrete danger”—that is, a “substantial and real”
206
danger, not merely a generalized risk. In the case of Tampa Bay
stadium, the Johnston court concluded that “there was no testimony
or evidence of a particularized threat to NFL games or to the
207
[Tampa] stadium,” merely a “general threat that terrorists might
208
attack any venue where a large number of Americans gather.”

201. State v. Seglen, 700 N.W.2d 702 (N.D. 2005).
202. Id. at 707.
203. Id. at 708.
204. Johnston v. Tampa Sports Auth., 442 F. Supp. 2d 1257 (M.D. Fla. 2006), rev’d per
curiam, 490 F.3d 820 (11th Cir. 2007), vacated and superseded on reh’g, 530 F.3d 1320 (11th Cir.
2008) (per curiam).
205. Id. at 1265–66. The judge in Johnston was worried about the slippery slope that would
be created if no such principled distinction were drawn. Echoing Bourgeois, the court noted that
allowing special needs to justify any antiterrorism suspicionless search would lead to searches at
“virtually all professional sporting events, high school graduations, indoor and outdoor concerts,
and parades.” Id. at 1269.
206. Id. at 1266.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 1268.
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4. Public Transportation. The final skirmish in the second wave
of suspicionless antiterrorism searches involved public transportation.
The first case, American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee v.
209
Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority, arose from searches
that took place on the buses and subway trains of Boston in July of
2004. As part of enhanced security during the Democratic National
Convention, the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority
(MBTA) conducted suspicionless searches of all individuals riding
210
buses or trains that passed near the convention site. When some bus
riders sought an injunction against the searches, the MBTA
responded with the now-familiar argument: these were merely
“administrative” searches “similar to the security inspections of
personal belongings conducted at airports and the entryways to
211
certain kinds of property, such as courthouses.” But this time the
argument won the day. Pointing to the then-recent subway bombings
in Madrid and Moscow, the trial judge noted that “it is not without
foundation to worry that a terrorist event might be aimed
212
simultaneously at the convention and the transit system.” The judge
was not bothered by the lack of a specific threat against the
Democratic Convention, noting that “there is also no reason to
believe that specific information is necessarily, or even frequently,
213
available before a terrorist attack,” and that airport searches take
place in the “absence of specific threat information about a particular
214
flight or even a particular airport.” The court also noted that the
visual inspection of bags, though intrusive, is “very similar to the
intrusions imposed under other, increasingly common, administrative
215
security search regimes.”
During the same month, approximately 230 miles to the
northwest, the Lake Champlain Transportation Company (LCT)
began conducting suspicionless searches of passengers on the ferry

209. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., No. 04-11652GAO, 2004 WL 1682859 (D. Mass. July 28, 2004).
210. Id. at *1. The searches consisted of a “visual search of the hand-carried items of all
passengers.” Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at *2.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at *4.
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216

between Grand Isle, Vermont and Plattsburgh, New York. In
217
Cassidy v. Chertoff, two of the passengers on the ferry claimed the
218
searches violated their Fourth Amendment rights. Once again, the
defendants responded by claiming that the searches served a special
219
need beyond those of ordinary law enforcement, and once again,
220
this argument prevailed. Even though there was no record of ferries
being targeted in the United States or anywhere else in the world, the
Second Circuit held that “the airline cases make it clear that the
government, in its attempt to counteract the threat of terrorism, need
not show that every airport or every ferry terminal is threatened by
221
terrorism;” the search is reasonable as long as the government has
determined that the ferries “are at a high risk of being involved in a
222
transportation security incident.”
One year later, the N.Y.P.D. began a program of suspicionless
searches at various subway stations. Unlike the Boston subway
searches in American-Arab, which targeted every passenger on a
certain train or bus line, the New York searches were based on
seemingly random checkpoints set up at different stations at different
223
times, and officers at the checkpoints only searched one out of
224
every series of passengers. The Second Circuit reviewed the
225
constitutionality of these searches in MacWade v. Kelly, and the
government again invoked the special needs doctrine, leading the
court to determine whether the search “serve[d] as [its] immediate
purpose an objective distinct from the ordinary evidence gathering
226
associated with crime investigation.” As in the other two public
216. Cassidy v. Chertoff, 471 F.3d 67, 72 (2d Cir. 2006). These searches consisted of visual
inspection of carry-on bags and of the trunks and interior of automobiles on the ferry. Id. at 73.
217. Cassidy v. Chertoff, 471 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 2006).
218. Id. at 73.
219. Id. at 74–75.
220. Id. at 86–87.
221. Id. at 83.
222. Id. at 83–84 (quoting Implementation of National Maritime Security Initiatives, 68 Fed.
Reg. 39,246 (July 1, 2003) (codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 101)).
223. MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260, 264 (2d Cir. 2006). Although the times and locations
of the checkpoints are meant to “appear random, undefined, and unpredictable,” they are
actually based on a “sophisticated host of criteria, such as fluctuations in passenger volume and
threat level, overlapping coverage provided by [the N.Y.P.D.’s] other counter-terrorism
initiatives, and available manpower.” Id.
224. Id. at 265.
225. MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260 (2d Cir. 2006).
226. Id. at 268 (quoting Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 663 (2d Cir. 2005)).
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transportation cases, the court held that the searches did indeed serve
a special need, in this case “preventing a terrorist attack on the
227
subway.” As in all the previous cases, there had been no specific,
concrete threat to the New York subway system, but the Second
228
Circuit still found the threat to be “sufficiently immediate.” Unlike
the Eleventh Circuit in Bourgeois, which refused to allow searches of
protestors that were merely based on a generalized “threat of
229
terrorism,” the Second Circuit held that “[a]ll that is required is that
the ‘risk to public safety [be] substantial and real’ instead of merely
230
‘symbolic.’”
5. The Current Status of Antiterrorism Searches. The first wave of
terrorism left us with routine suspicionless antiterrorism searches at
all airports and most public buildings. These searches have been
unanimously upheld by courts under the administrative search
doctrine, based on the theory that the searches further an
administrative purpose and were not primarily designed to detect or
investigate criminal activity. And perhaps just as significantly, these
searches have now become accepted by nearly every citizen as a
necessary part of modern life.
The second wave of terrorism has left behind the possibility of
suspicionless antiterrorism searches at subways and ferries, though
such searches are by no means widespread. As of now, these searches
have generated very little political opposition. Meanwhile, courts
have rejected suspicionless searches at sporting events, protest rallies,
231
and other potential terrorist targets.

227. Id. at 263.
228. Id. at 272.
229. Bourgeois v. Peters, 387 F.3d 1303, 1311 (11th Cir. 2004).
230. MacWade, 460 F.3d at 272 (quoting Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 322–23 (1997)).
231. Throughout this debate, the Supreme Court has never directly reviewed a single
antiterrorism suspicionless search case. As noted above, it has implicitly approved of the “first
wave” of suspicionless searches in dicta—as well as the application of the special needs doctrine
to those searches—in three separate cases. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 47–
48 (2000) (“Our holding . . . does not affect the validity of border searches or searches at places
like airports and government buildings, where the need for such measures to ensure public
safety can be particularly acute.”); Chandler, 520 U.S. at 323 (“[W]here the risk to public safety
is substantial and real, blanket suspicionless searches calibrated to the risk may rank as
‘reasonable’—for example, searches now routine at airports and at entrances to courts and other
official buildings.”); Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 675 n.3 (1989)
(“[W]e would not suppose that . . . the government would be precluded from conducting
[searches at airports] absent a demonstration of danger as to any particular airport or airline.”).
And although these cases were all decided before September 11, 2001, the broad language used
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Taking a cue from the earlier airport search cases, courts analyze
this new wave of cases under the special needs doctrine, but this
second wave of suspicionless antiterrorism searches—and the judicial
response to it—both continue to evolve. Law enforcement agencies
across the country continue to experiment with where to conduct
these searches and how extensive they should be, and courts still
struggle to determine the point at which these suspicionless searches
become unconstitutional—if indeed such a point exists. At one end of
the spectrum, the Eleventh Circuit held in Bourgeois that
antiterrorism searches do not serve a special need, whereas the
Second Circuit in Cassidy and MacWade reached the opposite
conclusion. And many of the cases that do accept the Cassidy
rationale—such as Seglen and Johnston—require the threat to reach
some undefined threshold of specificity before the searches can be
justified.
In short, the special needs doctrine does not provide much in the
way of principled guidance to courts struggling to evaluate
antiterrorism searches. To make matters worse, outside the
antiterrorism context, the Supreme Court has been engaged in a
similar struggle to find a principled distinction between searches for
special needs and searches for a law enforcement purpose.
B. Special Needs in Other Contexts
Two cases in particular show the limits that the Court has tried to
create for suspicionless searches over the past decade: Indianapolis v.
232
Edmond, a vehicular checkpoint case, and Ferguson v. City of
233
Charleston, a suspicionless drug testing case.
In City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, the Court considered a
suspicionless vehicular checkpoint meant to detect cars carrying
234
drugs. The city of Indianapolis argued that its checkpoint was
legally identical to the immigration checkpoint in Martinez-Fuerte and
points toward an approval of the second wave of antiterrorism searches: for example, the Von
Raab Court stated that even if there were no demonstration of risk or danger, “[i]t is sufficient
that the Government have a compelling interest in preventing an otherwise pervasive societal
problem from spreading to the particular context.” Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 675 n.3. The Second
Circuit relied upon this broad language in upholding ferry searches in Cassidy v. Chertoff, 471
F.3d 67, 83 (2d Cir. 2006), and subway searches in MacWade, 460 F.3d at 272.
232. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
233. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
234. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 34.
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the sobriety checkpoint in Sitz because those checkpoints “had the
same ultimate purpose of arresting those suspected of committing
235
crimes.” But the Court disagreed, stating that the checkpoint in
Martinez-Fuente was designed to maintain “the integrity of the
236
border” and the checkpoint in Sitz was designed to “reduc[e] the
immediate hazard posed by the presence of drunk drivers on the
237
highways.” In contrast, the primary purpose of the checkpoint in
238
Edmond was “to advance ‘the general interest in crime control.’”
The Court noted that it had “never approved a checkpoint program
whose primary purpose was to detect evidence of ordinary criminal
239
wrongdoing.”
The Edmond Court realized that the distinction it was making
was difficult to draw, conceding that “[s]ecuring the border and
apprehending drunk drivers are, of course, law enforcement activities,
and law enforcement officers employ arrests and criminal
240
prosecutions in pursuit of these goals.” The Court, however, argued
that these valid checkpoints were closely related to the distinct public
interests of border security and ensuring safe roadways, whereas the
public interest in preventing illegal drug distribution was nothing
241
more than general crime control.
In Ferguson v. City of Charleston, a public hospital in Charleston,
South Carolina began mandatory drug testing of all pregnant mothers
242
who sought treatment.
The government argued that these
suspicionless searches served the “special need” of protecting the
243
health of the mother and the unborn child, citing Skinner, Von

235. Id. at 42.
236. Id. at 38 (quoting United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985)).
237. Id. at 39.
238. Id. at 44 (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659 n.18 (1979)).
239. Id. at 41.
240. Id. at 42. The dissent also pointed out that the distinction made by the majority was
“not at all obvious.” Id. at 50 n.2 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
241. Id. at 42–44. The definition of “general crime control” was further refined in Illinois v.
Lidster, 540 U.S. 419 (2004), in which the Court upheld the use of a suspicionless vehicular
checkpoint to ask drivers for information about a recent hit and run that had occurred at the
same location. Id. at 427–28. Although the Court conceded that the Lidster checkpoint, like the
invalid Edmond checkpoint, was designed to meet the “general interest in crime control,” the
Court held there was a distinction between determining whether the motorist in the car had
committed a crime (as in Edmond) and asking the motorist for information about a crime that
was probably committed by someone else. Id. at 423–24.
242. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 70–71 (2001).
243. Id. at 81.
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244

Raab, and Acton. But the Court rejected this argument, holding that
the primary purpose of the searches was crime control rather than
245
protecting the fetus’s health. The Court distinguished Ferguson
from the other drug testing cases because the test results in Ferguson
were turned over to law enforcement and used in criminal
246
prosecutions. Once again the Court reaffirmed that “[i]n none of
our previous special needs cases have we upheld the collection of
247
evidence for criminal law enforcement purposes.”
As in Edmond, the Court worked hard to draw a principled
distinction between the Ferguson holding and other cases in which the
Court had upheld suspicionless searches even when the incriminating
evidence was used in a criminal prosecution. The Court noted that the
drug tests in Ferguson served the “immediate” purpose of law
enforcement, whereas the broader social goal of protecting the health
248
of the mother and fetus was an “ultimate” goal. In the valid special
needs cases, public safety was the “direct and primary” purpose of the
search—and using the results in a subsequent prosecution was
presumably nothing more than a beneficial side effect of the search—
whereas in Ferguson the drug test used law enforcement as a “means
249
to an end.” “This distinction is critical,” said the Court, “[b]ecause
law enforcement involvement always serves some broader social
250
purpose or objective.” Without this distinction, “virtually any
nonconsensual suspicionless search could be immunized under the
special needs doctrine by defining the search solely in terms of its
251
ultimate, rather than immediate, purpose.”

244. Id. at 77.
245. See id. at 85–86.
246. Id. (“The stark and unique fact that characterizes this case is that [this program] was
designed to obtain evidence of criminal conduct by the tested patients that would be turned
over to the police and that could be admissible in subsequent criminal prosecutions.”).
247. Id. at 83 n.20.
248. Id. at 82–83.
249. Id. at 83–84.
250. Id. at 84.
251. Id. Most recently, the Court’s newfound reluctance to allow suspicionless searches
could be implied from Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009). Although Gant is not a
suspicionless search case because it covers searches of a suspect’s car after he or she has been
arrested, it includes language that supports the need for probable cause or a warrant. See, e.g.,
id. at 1721 (“Construing Belton broadly to allow vehicle searches incident to any arrest would
serve no purpose except to provide a police entitlement, and it is anathema to the Fourth
Amendment to permit a warrantless search on that basis. For these reasons, we are
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IV. CAN SUSPICIONLESS ANTITERRORISM SEARCHES BE JUSTIFIED
BY THE SPECIAL NEEDS DOCTRINE?
Suspicionless searches can be generally grouped into three
different categories: true administrative searches, which do not
uncover evidence of criminal activity; searches that uncover evidence
of criminal activity, but whose fruits cannot be used in a subsequent
criminal prosecution; and searches whose fruits are in fact used in a
subsequent criminal prosecution. As this Article demonstrates, the
special needs doctrine cannot justify this third category of searches,
and it is in this category that antiterrorism searches belong.
A. Categorizing Permissible Suspicionless Searches
The law surrounding permissible suspicionless searches is in a
252
state of disarray, but it is possible to distill some general principles
from the various cases. First, there is only one context in which the
Supreme Court has openly admitted that a suspicionless search is
permissible for criminal law purposes: searches of probationers and
253
parolees. In this category of cases, the Court has held that the
254
defendant has such a diminished expectation of privacy that the
state has the ability to conduct a suspicionless search and use the
255
results to criminally incriminate the defendant.
For every other type of suspicionless search, the Court has
claimed that the search is invalid unless it serves a purpose other than
traditional law enforcement. The Court uses different language in
different contexts—the search must not be “aimed at the discovery of

unpersuaded by the State’s arguments that a broad reading of Belton would meaningfully
further law enforcement interests and justify a substantial intrusion on individuals’ privacy.”).
252. See generally Edwin J. Butterfoss, A Suspicionless Search and Seizure Quagmire: The
Supreme Court Revives the Pretext Doctrine and Creates Another Fine Fourth Amendment Mess,
40 CREIGHTON L. REV. 419 (2007) (“[T]he ‘category’ of suspicionless searches [has become] a
jurisprudential mess, with the only consistent theme being that suspicionless search schemes
[have been] regularly upheld as lawful.”).
253. See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 116 (2001).
254. The Supreme Court has held that government surveillance does not constitute a
“search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment unless the surveillance infringes upon
an individual’s “reasonable expectation of privacy.” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360
(1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). Thus, if an individual does not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in a certain context—for example, if he is conducting an activity in a public place, or if
he is in prison—then the government can watch his actions without violating his reasonable
expectation of privacy and thus not violate the Fourth Amendment.
255. Knights, 534 U.S. at 119.
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256

evidence of crime;” it must serve “special needs[] beyond the
257
normal need for law enforcement;” or it must fulfill a purpose other
258
than “general crime control” —but the requirement itself remains
constant. This requirement—assuming it is actually followed in
practice—implies that the Fourth Amendment’s primary purpose is to
prevent the state from invading the rights of citizens during a criminal
investigation, and so there is no reason why it should limit the
259
government’s actions outside the criminal context.
This is a
controversial proposition, but it is an inevitable conclusion when
examining the special needs doctrine. One benefit of this rule—if it
were actually followed—is that it would result in a bright-line rule
providing clear guidance to law enforcement and protecting
individuals from random, suspicionless searches during criminal
investigations.
But as this review of the case law has demonstrated, the non–law
enforcement purpose requirement has not been followed in practice.
In many of these suspicionless searches, the government conducts
searches that—if it detects what it is designed to detect—will produce
evidence of criminal activity: possession of firearms or explosives,
possession of stolen vehicles, illegal presence in the country,
possession or use of illegal substances, or driving while intoxicated.
And to state that the purpose of the search is distinct from the
“normal need for law enforcement” is merely a semantic game
because the special need that justifies the weaker search standard is
usually nothing more than the policy justification for the original
criminalization of the conduct. Hijacking is illegal because of the
dangers it poses to airline passengers; immigration laws exist to
secure the country’s borders; drugs are illegal because those who use
them suffer health effects and an impairment of their abilities; drunk
driving is prohibited because those who drink and drive create a
danger on the public roadways.
In this sense, the suspicionless search jurisprudence is little more
than an exercise in redefining the nature of criminal activity and

256. Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967).
257. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
258. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 43 (2000).
259. See, e.g., United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 563 (1985) (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (“[The Fourth Amendment safeguards] should govern border searches when
carried out for purposes of criminal investigation.”).
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thereby redefining the permissible methods of detecting that activity.
A police officer could enforce the law against drunk driving, a law
that exists to keep the highways safe, or she could set up a checkpoint
to detect drunk drivers to keep the highways safe, and in so doing
detect individuals who are breaking the law. In the former case, she
would need to have probable cause before pulling over a car, whereas
in the latter case, she would not need any level of individualized
suspicion because keeping highways safe is a special need.
To be fair, this objection does not fit all of the permissible
suspicionless search cases equally. For some of them, the lack of a law
enforcement purpose is more than a semantic difference; it is an
important distinction that alters the nature and extent of the search in
significant ways. To understand this point, it is helpful to divide the
special needs cases into three different categories.
The first category consists of the original administrative searches,
in which non–law enforcement officials conduct searches to enforce
health and safety violations. These include building code inspections,
Occupational Safety and Health Administration workplace
inspections, mine safety inspections, and the like. Such searches do
not seek to enforce criminal laws, and so the searches represent a
“less hostile intrusion than the typical policeman’s search for the
260
fruits and instrumentalities of crime.” This category does not
include all administrative search cases because courts have applied
the “administrative search” term to a number of cases in which the
search has a clear crime-control purpose. For example, the search in
New York v. Burger—in which the police searched a junkyard for
evidence of stolen auto parts and ultimately arrested the junkyard
owner on criminal charges—was termed an administrative search
even though it was designed to uncover evidence of criminal
261
activity.
The second category is comprised of searches that are designed
to uncover evidence of unambiguously criminal activity, but that can
legitimately be classified as special needs searches because the results
are not used for a law enforcement purpose. In these cases, the search
serves a purpose “other than that of traditional law enforcement,” not
because of the type of information being sought, but rather because

260. Camara, 387 U.S. at 530.
261. See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 708–10 (1987). Burger belongs in the third
category of suspicionless search cases because the search was upheld based on the defendant’s
reduced expectation of privacy. Id. at 703–07.
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of what is done with the information after it is obtained. This category
includes the drug tests of school children and public employees, which
are designed to find evidence of criminal activity, but whose results
are not used in a subsequent criminal prosecution.
The third category involves searches that have a clear law
enforcement purpose, and whose results are used by law enforcement
in criminal prosecutions. This category includes antiterrorism
searches, vehicular checkpoints, and some of the later administrative
searches in cases such as Burger. For some of these searches, the
Supreme Court has stressed that the nature of the intrusion is very
slight and that the subject has a reduced expectation of privacy—
briefly stopping a vehicle or checking records and inventory for a
highly regulated business—though these factors are not present for
antiterrorism searches. But assuming individuals in these situations
have some expectation of privacy (unlike probationers and parolees),
courts must still engage in the semantic game of redefining a crimecontrol search as a special needs search.
B. Placing Antiterrorism Searches into the Proper Category
Once permissible suspicionless search cases are organized in this
manner, it becomes easy to see that suspicionless antiterrorism cases
fall into the third category of special needs cases. These searches are
conducted by law enforcement personnel—police, TSA officers, court
officers—and any incriminating search results may be used against
the suspect in a criminal trial. And what is more, these searches are
even less defensible than the other special needs cases in that
category because the other cases involve situations in which the
suspect has a reduced expectation of privacy. In contrast, courts have
held that subjects of antiterrorism searches—unlike parolees or
occupants of cars—“possess[] an undiminished expectation of
262
privacy” for items carried on their bodies or in their bags.
Furthermore, the ultrafine distinction that courts make between
special needs and law enforcement needs is especially strained in the
antiterrorism context. As the Eleventh Circuit pointed out in
Bourgeois, the alleged special need of “public safety” is “inextricably
intertwined” with the goal of crime control in the antiterrorism

262.

See, e.g., MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260, 273 (2d Cir. 2006).
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263

context. Antiterrorism searches are designed to prevent individuals
from intentionally committing acts of violence, and to apprehend
those who attempt to commit these acts; to claim that this is a public
safety purpose rather than a law-enforcement or crime-control
264
purpose is simply disingenuous.
265
As noted above, the early cases that justified antiterrorism
searches as administrative searches were reacting to an extraordinary
situation in which there appeared to be no other way to prevent an
epidemic of hijackings and bombings of public buildings. The only
doctrine available at the time to justify suspicionless searches was the
administrative search rationale from Camara. These early courts
therefore borrowed the terms “administrative” and “regulatory” from
Camara and used them in a way that had nothing to do with the
terms’ actual meaning. The Ninth Circuit, for example, noted that
searches at airports were “conducted as part of a general regulatory
scheme in furtherance of an administrative purpose, namely, to
prevent the carrying of weapons or explosives aboard aircraft, and
266
thereby to prevent hijackings.” To say that blanket, suspicionless
searches of everyone who boards a plane is a “regulatory scheme” is
simply an exercise in making a term mean whatever one wants it to
mean; likewise, the prevention of violent crimes is an “administrative

263. Bourgeois v. Peters, 387 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (11th Cir. 2004); see also supra notes 180–
85 and accompanying text.
264. There is, perhaps, a distinction between trying to prevent crime and trying to detect
crime. If a government activity is only meant to prevent crime, the individualized suspicion
requirements of the Fourth Amendment should not apply. For example, installing a window
made of bulletproof glass at all post office counters is a method of preventing crimes—there is
surely no need to demonstrate individualized suspicion for every customer who approaches the
window. It could be argued that suspicionless antiterrorism searches should be analogized to
these bulletproof glass windows—if a government agent searched everyone who entered the
post office, for example, the search would only be intended to prevent crimes, and so there
would be no need to demonstrate any individualized suspicion. The problem with making this
distinction is that in practice the suspicionless antiterrorist searches are used both to prevent
and detect crime—and ultimately to punish the criminal as well. If the search recovers a
weapon, the subject of the search is arrested and the weapon is used as evidence in a subsequent
prosecution. The only way to ensure that the suspicionless searches are truly only being used to
prevent a crime would be to preclude the government from using any fruits of the search in a
subsequent prosecution. See infra Part VI.B.
265. See supra notes 18–28 and accompanying text.
266. United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 908 (9th Cir. 1973), abrogated by United States v.
Aukai, 497 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc).
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purpose” only if one invents a completely new definition for the term
267
“administrative.”
This contrivance has been encouraged by the confused way in
which the special needs doctrine has evolved over the past few
decades, with different justifications becoming significant in different
contexts. If the same doctrine is applied to widely different factual
situations (from conducting building code inspections to drug testing
schoolchildren to detecting terrorists on the subway), it creates
confusion when one court interprets the language of another court’s
precedent. Consider Von Raab, the case in which the Supreme Court
upheld suspicionless drug testing of United States customs
employees. The search in this case falls into the second category of
permissible suspicionless searches—because the results of the test are
not used for criminal prosecution, the Court can legitimately claim
268
that the search serves a special need unrelated to law enforcement.
But the court also attempts to place this search into the first
category—claiming that it serves a purely “administrative” or
“regulatory” purpose by analogizing the use of cocaine by customs
employees to the inventory searches: “[T]he traditional probablecause standard may be unhelpful in analyzing the reasonableness of
routine administrative functions, especially when the Government
seeks to prevent the development of hazardous conditions or to
detect violations that rarely generate articulable grounds for
269
searching any particular place or person.” In making this argument,
the Court cites a number of legitimate administrative search cases,
270
271
including an inventory search case, a border search case, and a
272
building code inspection case.
It is already a bit of a stretch to say that cocaine use by customs
officials is a “hazardous condition” equivalent to building code

267. Once this terminology had become enshrined in precedent, it was perpetuated by later
generations of cases. The Ninth Circuit recently upheld an airport search as an administrative
search, quoting this same language from the Davis case. United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955,
960 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc).
268. Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 666 (1989). The Court
also notes that customs employees have a diminished expectation of privacy, id. at 672, but this
was not the primary reason that the searches were found constitutional.
269. Id. at 668 (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted).
270. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 369–71 (1987).
271. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556–57 (1976).
272. Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534–36 (1967).
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violations, and it is difficult to equate suspicionless drug testing with
the “routine administrative function” of searching an automobile
before it is impounded. But the Court persisted in its analogy, stating
that drug use by customs agents was a “latent or hidden condition[],”
and “discover[ing] . . . or . . . prevent[ing] the[] development” of such
273
conditions justified a suspicionless search.
The lower courts that applied the special needs doctrine to
suspicionless antiterrorism searches merely carried this analogy one
step further. For example, this is how the Second Circuit in MacWade
upheld suspicionless searches on the subway:
As a legal matter, courts traditionally have considered special the
government’s need to “prevent” and “discover . . . latent or hidden”
hazards, Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 668, in order to ensure the safety of
mass transportation mediums, such as trains, airplanes, and
highways. We have no doubt that concealed explosives are a hidden
hazard . . . . Accordingly, preventing a terrorist from bombing the
subways constitutes a special need that is distinct from ordinary post
hoc criminal investigation. Further, the fact that an officer
incidentally may discover a different kind of contraband and arrest
274
its possessor does not alter the [p]rogram’s intended purpose.

A terrorist attempting to carry a bomb onto a subway (or an
airplane) is not a “latent or hidden hazard.” He is an individual
attempting to commit an extremely serious crime. Any attempt to
deter or detect his actions is purely a law enforcement function, and
should be treated as such. And any attempt by courts to claim that a
search designed to detect and prevent this crime is an administrative
or regulatory search cannot ultimately be sustained.
Thus, even the contorted jurisprudence of the special needs
doctrine cannot justify these searches. But this conclusion leads to
another question: if suspicionless antiterrorist searches cannot be
justified by the special needs doctrine, is there any other way to
justify them? We will address this question in Part V.

273. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 668.
274. MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260, 270–71 (2d Cir. 2006) (first alteration in original)
(citations omitted).
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V. OTHER POSSIBLE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR SUSPICIONLESS
ANTITERRORIST SEARCHES
At first, the search for a legitimate justification for suspicionless
antiterrorist searches may appear to be a waste of time, or at best a
purely academic pursuit. In reality, antiterrorism searches in airports
and courthouses are ubiquitous, widely accepted, and seemingly
indispensable. But it is important to find a legitimate doctrinal
underpinning for these searches for two reasons. First, courts’
responses to the second phase of antiterrorism searches have been
wildly inconsistent, both in terms of reasoning and results. And
second, continued application of the special needs doctrine to these
searches will create confusing precedent that could be applied to
other areas of the law, leading to even greater damage to the
individualized suspicion requirement. Thus, it is worth seeking
another justification for suspicionless antiterrorism searches—or, if
one cannot be found, to find another way to reconcile these searches
275
with the Fourth Amendment. Other commentators have suggested
numerous justifications for suspicionless antiterrorism searches—
using a generalized “reasonableness” test, deferring to the legislature,
applying the doctrine of implied consent, and creating an entirely new
exception to the Fourth Amendment. But as this Article
demonstrates, none of these proposals can serve to justify these
searches.
A. Evaluation Under a Generalized Reasonableness Test
Even if antiterrorism searches cannot be justified as a special
need, most courts and commentators (and indeed lay people) would
still find them constitutional under the general test of reasonableness.
As the Supreme Court has repeated dozens of times, reasonableness
is the “touchstone of the constitutionality of a governmental
276
search,” and whether or not a search is reasonable “depends on all
277
of the circumstances surrounding the search or seizure.” When the
circuit courts first began approving the suspicionless antiterrorist
searches in the early 1970s, many of them relied on a generalized
275. For a discussion of how to reconcile these searches with the Fourth Amendment, see
infra Part VI.
276. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 828 (2002).
277. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989) (quoting United
States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985)).
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reasonableness standard, “balancing the need for a search against the
278
Indeed, all of the current
offensiveness of the intrusion.”
suspicionless antiterrorism cases—after applying the special needs
test to bypass the general requirement of a warrant and probable
cause—essentially apply a reasonableness analysis. The Second
Circuit defines the suspicionless antiterrorism test as follows:
First, as a threshold matter, the search must “serve as [its]
immediate purpose an objective distinct from the ordinary evidence
gathering associated with crime investigation.” Second, once the
government satisfies that threshold requirement, the court
determines whether the search is reasonable by balancing several
competing considerations. These balancing factors include (1) the
weight and immediacy of the government interest; (2) “the nature of
the privacy interest allegedly compromised by” the search; (3) “the
character of the intrusion imposed by” the search; and (4) the
279
efficacy of the search in advancing the government interest.

So why not abolish the somewhat artificial threshold test of
special needs and simply skip to the second step and conduct a
reasonableness analysis? The extremely violent and destructive
nature of terrorist acts surely affects the appropriateness of a search
meant to detect or deter such acts, and this factor would be reflected
in a general reasonableness test. For example, if police have twentyfour hours to find an atomic bomb that they know is hidden in one of
a hundred houses, it would be reasonable for them to conduct
280
suspicionless searches of each of those houses. If police pull over
every car that drives by a reservoir because the dam is a “potential
terrorist target,” the search would likely be unreasonable.
But these are the extreme cases—and therefore the easy cases.
As our review of the second wave of antiterrorism case law shows, it
is indeed the hard cases that make bad, confusing, and inconsistent
law. Thus, finding a reasonable, principled justification for these
searches is critical—and it is more important now than ever. If there
is no principled way to evaluate antiterrorism searches, then there is
no way of knowing the limits of these searches—if they have limits at
281
all. Under the current law, the only thing resembling a principled
limitation to the searches is the factor explicitly stated in Johnston
278.
279.
280.
281.

See, e.g., United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496, 500 (2d Cir. 1974).
MacWade, 460 F.3d at 268–69 (citations omitted).
For a discussion of this hypothetical, see Gould & Stern, supra note 3, at 779–80.
See Bourgeois v. Peters, 387 F.3d 1303, 1311–12 (11th Cir. 2004).
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and Stauber (and hinted at in Seglen and Bourgeois): that
suspicionless antiterrorism searches are unconstitutional unless there
282
is a “concrete danger” that is “substantial and real.” In rejecting the
suspicionless searches of individuals at sporting arenas, Johnston and
Seglen noted that there had been no history of terrorist attacks or
283
threats against sporting arenas —in contrast, Johnston argues that
searches of public buildings were allowed after “an outburst of acts of
violence, bombings of federal buildings and hundreds of bomb
threats, resulting in massive evacuations of federal property and
284
direct financial loss to the Government,” and searches in the New
York City subway were allowed because “NYC’s mass transit system,
including the subway system, had been targeted by terrorists in the
past, and within the last year terrorists had bombed commuter trains
in Madrid, the subway system in Moscow and had attempted to bomb
285
the London subway system.”
Thus, under the current reasonableness analysis, the only
limiting factor for suspicionless antiterrorist searches is whether a
threat is “substantial and real” or merely the background threat of
286
terrorism that presumably has become part of everyday existence.
But this is rather thin protection; there is little doubt that if a terrorist
attack occurred at a sporting arena or a political protest, the holdings
in Johnston and Seglen or Stauber and Bourgeois would be overruled
by the next court to consider searches in these contexts. In this sense,
it is the terrorists who control the extent of our Fourth Amendment
rights: by hijacking planes and blowing up buildings, they persuade
courts to allow suspicionless searches at airports and public buildings;
282. Johnston v. Tampa Sports Auth., 442 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1266 (M.D. Fla. 2006), rev’d per
curiam, 490 F.3d 820 (11th Cir. 2007), vacated and superseded on reh’g, 530 F.3d 1320 (11th Cir.
2008) (per curiam); Stauber v. City of New York, Nos. 03 Civ. 9162, 03 Civ. 9163, 03 Civ. 9164,
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13350, at *93 (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 2004); see also Bourgeois, 387 F.3d at
1311; State v. Seglen, 700 N.W.2d 702, 707–08 (N.D. 2005).
283. Johnston, 442 F. Supp. 2d at 1266–69; Seglen, 700 N.W.2d at 708.
284. Johnston, 442 F. Supp. 2d at 1269 (quoting Downing v. Kunzig, 454 F.2d 1230, 1231–32
(6th Cir. 1972)).
285. Id. (citing MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260, 272 (2d Cir. 2006)).
286. This rule means that a judge must somehow determine at what point the ever-present
“background threat” of terrorism becomes a “substantial and real” threat. If a terrorist group
issues a statement that it will attack a sports arena sometime in the next year, does that make
the threat to all sports arenas substantial and real? What if it named a city but no date? Would it
matter if the terrorist group had been known to have successfully committed terrorist acts in the
past? In short, how could a judge intelligently determine the probability of such a threat, and
what is the probability threshold for “substantial and real”?

SIMMONS IN FINAL.DOC

2010]

1/5/2010 2:12:49 AM

SEARCHING FOR TERRORISTS

897

by bombing mass transit in London, Madrid, and Moscow, they
convince courts to allow suspicionless searches on ferries and
subways; if they successfully target a sports arena or a political protest
rally, courts will (under current doctrine) begin to allow suspicionless
searches in those contexts as well. And as this Article’s discussion of
the first wave of suspicionless antiterrorist searches demonstrates, the
search procedures (and their acceptance by the courts and by the
general population) does not end when the threat subsides.
Throughout the 1990s there was not a single domestic passenger
airplane hijacking, and the epidemic of shootings and bombings of
courthouses disappeared—yet the suspicionless searches continued,
and probably will continue forever. As noted above, the Supreme
Court cited the infinitesimally low number of airplane hijackers
caught through the suspicionless search program as evidence that the
287
programs were “successful.”
Yet when this “successful”
suspicionless search program failed spectacularly—resulting in the
death of 3,000 Americans on a single day—the government reaction
was to make the suspicionless searches even more rigorous and
intrusive, and the reaction of the courts was to reaffirm (in even
stronger language) the necessity and constitutionality of those
288
searches.
More generally, antiterrorist searches are particularly ill suited to
a generalized balancing test or a reasonableness analysis, for the
simple reason that the gravity of the potential harm is so great that it
overpowers any other variable that could be placed into the balancing
equation. Every first-year criminal law student is presented with some
variant of this classic hypothetical, intended to highlight the
difference between utilitarianism and retributivism: would the police
be justified in torturing an innocent person if it could provide
information that would prevent a nuclear bomb from detonating and
destroying a city? The threat of terrorism turns the second half of this
hypothetical into grim reality: wouldn’t it be reasonable to allow
nearly any type of surveillance or search program if it could prevent

287. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. In Von Raab, the Court noted that in fifteen
years, 9.5 billion people and ten billion pieces of luggage had undergone a suspicionless search,
and only forty-two thousand firearms had been detected. Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v.
Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 675 n.3 (1989). Thus, every suspicionless search that occurred had a
.00042 percent chance of detecting a firearm.
288. See, e.g., United States v. Yang, 286 F.3d 940, 944 n.1 (7th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he events of
September 11, 2001, only emphasize the heightened need to conduct searches at this nation’s
international airports.”).
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289

catastrophic harm? Should a court somehow give less weight to the
government interest in a search seeking to prevent a terrorist attack
that may only kill a few hundred people as opposed to many
thousands of people? Can a court really evaluate the likelihood of a
terrorist attack in any given context, other than by simply accepting
the risk assessment the government provides for them?
As the Eleventh Circuit noted in Bourgeois, “reasonableness” is
290
a term of art in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence; courts must
interpret the term “in the light of established Fourth Amendment
291
principles,”
including the warrant requirement, prior judicial
292
scrutiny, probable cause, and individualized suspicion. It is very rare
for a search that lacks any of these requirements to be deemed
“reasonable.” If the term were given its ordinary meaning, the
constitutionality of a search would be determined by “the judge’s
personal opinions about the governmental and privacy interests at
293
stake.”

289. In a recent article, Anthony Coveny described the current balancing test for
suspicionless searches as a mathematical formula, in which PC stands for public concern, E is a
percentage that represents the efficacy of the searches, and LI stands for the level of intrusion of
the search. If PC x E > LI, the search should be allowed, but if PC x E < LI, then the search is
unreasonable and hence unconstitutional. Coveny, supra note 2, at 379–80. When public
concern is preventing terrorism, PC is essentially infinite. Coveny quotes the Second Circuit
statement that “the government interest in preventing a terrorist attack on the subway was ‘of
the very highest order.’” Id. at 379 (quoting MacWade, 460 F.3d at 267). Other courts use similar
language when applying the balancing test. See, e.g., United States v. Hartwell, 436 F.3d 174, 179
(3d Cir. 2006) (“[T]here can be no doubt that preventing terrorist attacks on airplanes is of
paramount importance.”); United States v. Marquez, 410 F.3d 612, 618 (9th Cir. 2005) (“It is
hard to overestimate the need to search air travelers for weapons and explosives . . . .”).
Therefore, “as long as the effectiveness measure is anything but zero, the level of intrusiveness
is near immaterial.” Coveny, supra note 2, at 379. And if PC is not set to infinity, how should it
be calculated in evaluating the reasonableness of most antiterrorist searches?
290. See generally Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L.
REV. 503 (2007) (discussing why courts have not adopted a test for reasonableness).
291. Bourgeois v. Peters, 387 F.3d 1303, 1313 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting Chimel v. California,
395 U.S. 752, 765 (1969)).
292. Id. at 1313–16.
293. See id. at 1314. A number of commentators have also recognized this problem.
Professor Ricardo Bascuas notes that using a balancing test to determine what is “reasonable” is
not even “a legal inquiry or test” because
it is not a process of discerning general rules or principles and applying them
evenhandedly to specific disputes as they arise. Rather, balancing is for judges, as
Justice Scalia put it, “a regrettable concession of defeat—an acknowledgement that
we have passed the point where ‘law,’ properly speaking, has any further
application.” The vagueness of the term “reasonable” makes not only the outcome
but the very criteria of the “test” unpredictable.
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Therefore, reasonableness alone provides neither a principled
reason for allowing suspicionless antiterrorist searches, nor a sensible,
robust limitation on their use. A search for a more principled basis to
justify these searches will not only help to legitimate them, but will
also contain them so that they do not swallow up the entire Fourth
Amendment.
B. Legislatures Should Decide What Is Reasonable
Political process theory offers a more sophisticated defense of
the reasonableness analysis by arguing that the democratic process
will provide necessary limits on the government’s behavior. The
argument runs like this: because the Fourth Amendment’s
prohibition on unreasonable searches is indeterminate, the task falls
to either courts or legislatures to interpret the meaning and scope of
294
the term. According to political process theory, the legislature
should conduct this task because the interpretation of democratically
elected legislators is more legitimate than the opinions of unelected
295
judges. The courts should thus defer to the legislatures in these
situations, and only conduct a rational basis review of any legislative
interpretations of ambiguous constitutional terms.

Bascuas, supra note 2, at 748 (footnote omitted) (quoting Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a
Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1181 (1989)). Professor Thomas Clancy, writing in
1995—well before the second wave of antiterrorism searches began—warned against
suspicionless “checkpoints and detectors . . . at stadiums, in schools, and at other public
gatherings,” all justified by a “totally subjective reasonableness analysis.” Thomas K. Clancy,
The Role of Individualized Suspicion in Assessing the Reasonableness of Searches and Seizures,
25 U. MEM. L. REV. 483, 624–25, 627 (1995) (footnotes omitted). Clancy argues that there must
be a “return to the central importance given to individualized suspicion by the framers,” though
he does not explain how this will apply to airport searches. Id. at 634. Bascuas proposes his own
test for antiterrorism searches, which this Article discusses infra at notes 335–38 and
accompanying text.
Indeed, the vague nature of the term “reasonableness” was evident in the Supreme
Court’s most recent school search case, in which a schoolgirl was strip-searched on suspicion
that she was carrying illegal prescription drugs. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 129
S. Ct. 2633, 2641–43 (2009). Whether it was reasonable for school officials to conduct such an
intrusive search to combat the possession and distribution of drugs in school comes down to
little more than the personal opinion of the judge or judges hearing the case. In Safford United
School District No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009), the trial judge found the search to be
reasonable, a three-judge appellate panel agreed, an en banc panel split sharply on the question,
and the Supreme Court finally ruled that the search was unreasonable. Id. at 2637–39.
294. Political process theory focuses on ambiguous terms in the Constitution, such as due
process, equal protection, or unreasonable searches and seizures. See Richard C. Worf, supra
note 2, at 100–01.
295. Id at 101.
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Aside from the increased legitimacy from the democratic
process, legislative interpretations of reasonableness are superior to
judicial determinations for two reasons. First, the legislature is in a far
better position than the courts to determine what is reasonable—it
can run a cost-benefit analysis and has better access to the necessary
296
facts in making such a determination. Second, the legislature is
more flexible. It can vary from state to state or even city to city,
depending on the preferences of the community, and if circumstances
change—if terrorists begin a successful campaign of violence, for
example—it can adapt much more quickly than the precedent-bound
297
judicial system.
Political process theory recognizes that the democratic process
sometimes breaks down, at which point courts must be more
aggressive in reviewing a given search. For example, if a search
procedure had been instituted by the executive branch, either without
legislative approval or pursuant to an overly broad grant of discretion
on the part of the legislature, courts would need to conduct a strict
298
scrutiny analysis. Similarly, courts should intervene when searches
disadvantage a discrete and insular minority, who may not have
299
adequate representation in the legislature. In other words, the
Fourth Amendment is only meant to be a check on majoritarian rule
300
when the political process cannot work effectively.
Permissible suspicionless searches are particularly easy to justify
under political process theory—provided they are properly
authorized by the legislature—because they are nondiscriminatory by
their very nature. They are not directed at a specific class of
underprivileged or disenfranchised individuals; they affect everyone
more or less equally. Thus, assuming the benefits and costs of the
search are spread equally throughout the voting community, the
search program cannot be seen as the result of a failure of the
democratic process.
Furthermore, deference to legislators seems even more sensible
in the context of antiterrorism searches. It is hard enough for judges

296. Id. at 120–26.
297. Id. at 129–30 (“If mass terror strikes, it might be disastrous to apply old precedents to
determine what constitutes a reasonable general search or seizure.”).
298. Id. at 138–52.
299. Id. at 152–58.
300. Id. at 189–90.
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to make reasoned, informed judgments about the necessity and
efficacy of other types of searches, such as roadblocks to prevent
drunk driving, or frisks to determine if suspects carry a weapon. But
this task becomes even more daunting for antiterrorism searches. The
Second Circuit in MacWade explained why it deferred to the
government’s experts who testified that the suspicionless subway
searches were an effective method of deterring a terrorist attack:
We will not peruse, parse, or extrapolate four months’ worth of
data . . . . Counter-terrorism experts and politically accountable
officials have undertaken the delicate and esoteric task of deciding
how best to marshal their available resources in light of the
conditions prevailing on any given day. We will not—and may not—
301
second-guess the minutiae of their considered decisions.

But MacWade is an outlier in this instance. For the most part,
courts have rejected applying political process theory to the Fourth
302
Amendment, and with good reason. Given the central role of the
Fourth Amendment in criminal procedure jurisprudence, deferring to
the democratically elected legislature to determine what is reasonable
is deeply troubling. Some commentators, such as Professor Akhil
Amar, have argued persuasively that the Fourth Amendment should
303
not be thought of primarily as a rule of criminal procedure —but
there is no denying that, rightly or wrongly, this is what the Fourth
Amendment has become. And as a rule of criminal procedure—
whose primary purpose is to protect the individual citizen from
overreaching by the government during criminal prosecutions—the
Fourth Amendment is dangerously unsuitable for political process
analysis.
It is no accident that political process analysis has not been
applied to the rest of the criminal procedure rules in the Bill of
Rights—there is no deference to the legislature to determine when
Miranda rights apply, for example, or when the right to counsel
attaches. Granted, the term “unreasonable” is ambiguous enough to
require interpretation, but giving a majority of voters the right to

301. MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260, 274 (2d Cir. 2006).
302. Even the strongest proponents of political process theory concede that the Fourth
Amendment has “remained largely invulnerable to political process theory.” Worf, supra note
2, at 103–04 (noting Akhil Amar’s acknowledgment that political process theory has had little
influence on Fourth Amendment jurisprudence).
303. Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 758–59
(1994).
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interpret it—and thereby set the parameters for how police interact
with ordinary citizens—could lead to extreme results, for two reasons.
First, a majority of voters (or their representatives who make the
laws) will frequently overreact in times of crisis, trading freedoms in
exchange for short-term security. The government responses to this
decade’s second wave of terrorism are a case in point: in the wake of
the September 11 attacks, the federal government took a number of
steps to curtail civil liberties to detect and prevent other terrorist
activities, including detaining citizens indefinitely without charge and
without providing counsel, eavesdropping on conversations between
attorneys and clients, and broadening the scope of wiretapping
304
programs. The courts have been very active in reviewing and in
305
some cases rejecting these reactions.
Political process theory would approve of judicial review of some
of these rules—for example, rules allowing the government to listen
in on conversations between criminal law attorneys and clients only
burden accused criminals, who hardly have a proportionate say in the
legislature. Others—those that apply broadly to all citizens—would
be left untouched by courts if judges agreed to defer to the legislative
enactments. But these rules are not the result of a reflective
legislative body calmly weighing the costs and benefits—indeed, they
are little better than pandering to the political moment.
This short-term pandering might not be so dangerous were it not
for the second problem: once civil liberties are restricted, the
restrictions are essentially permanent. What the majority of voters
think is reasonable will inevitably reflect the rules that they have
grown accustomed to in their everyday lives. The reason that searches
at airports and public courthouses are now thought to be reasonable
by the vast majority of citizens has nothing to do with whether they
are in fact a sensible, least intrusive solution to a severe and ongoing
problem—though they may in fact be. Rather, they are thought to be
reasonable because they have been around for so long that we no
longer even notice them or perceive them to be intrusive. And regular
searches in some contexts also tend to desensitize individuals to
identical searches in other contexts—that is, now that suspicionless

304.
305.

See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
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searches are ubiquitous at airports, people are less likely to find them
306
unreasonable at schools, rock concerts, sporting events, and so on.
Courts, on the other hand, are far more insulated from the
politics of the moment, and far more likely to uphold the principles of
the Fourth Amendment—even in times of crisis, which is when such a
defense is needed the most. This is not to say that the courts’ analyses
and holdings are immune to changes in the world, merely that they
are more likely to apply constant principles of law to the evolving
307
threats and dangers that arise.
Simply put, it is not very comforting to conclude that the Fourth
Amendment—a fundamental protection against government
overreaching—says whatever the government wants it to say. If the
Fourth Amendment is to have any meaning at all, courts must have
the power to review the constitutionality of searches against some
principled standard.
C. Consent
Even if there is no principled reason to allow suspicionless
antiterrorism searches, law enforcement could conceivably rely on the
implied or express consent given by the individual being searched. In
other words, if the individual does not wish to be searched, he or she
can simply choose not to board an airplane, ride the subway, or
attend the political protest. Conversely, if the individual does choose
to engage in the activity, he or she is consenting—at least implicitly—
to the search that goes along with the activity.

306. See, e.g., Sara Kornblatt, Note, Are Emerging Technologies in Airport Passenger
Screening Reasonable Under the Fourth Amendment?, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 385, 404–05 (2007)
(“There are metal detectors at courthouses, schools, and stadiums. While some may find
magnetometers at these types of locations annoying, society in general has allowed their use
without an uproar that Fourth Amendment rights are being violated.” (footnote omitted)).
307. There is even an argument that once a threat has receded, courts are more likely than
voters to revisit the restrictions on liberty that they put into place. Professor William Stuntz has
noted that the twentieth century saw a pattern in the way the Supreme Court interpreted the
Fourth Amendment: “Crime fell in the 1940s and 1950s; Fourth Amendment rights expanded in
the 1960s. Crime rose sharply in the 1960s; Fourth Amendment protection receded in the 1970s
and 1980s. Crime fell again in the 1990s, and by the end of that decade Fourth Amendment
rights were once again expanding.” William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE
L.J. 2137, 2155 (2002). Thus, it is not that courts are unresponsive to the changing world, but
that they are merely slower to respond—both for institutional reasons, and because they are
applying fixed principles of law, which legislatures do not do. This deliberateness is probably a
virtue when courts are considering alterations to the scope of Fourth Amendment protections.
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Consent is a well-established exception to the Fourth
308
Amendment’s requirement of individualized suspicion.
Law
enforcement officers are permitted to search anyone, for any reason,
as long as the individual agrees to the search. In the early years, some
courts relied—at least in part—on an implied-consent argument to
justify suspicionless antiterrorism searches. In United States v.
309
Davis, for example, the Ninth Circuit argued that airport screenings
are constitutional “only if they recognize the right of a person to
310
avoid search by electing not to board the aircraft.” This was in part
because a consensual search was thought to be less intrusive than a
compulsory search, but also because this helped to ensure that the
purpose of the search was the special need of preventing hijackings
rather than the law enforcement need of general crime control:
[A] compelled search . . . would not contribute to barring weapons
and explosives from the plane, [and therefore] it could serve only
the purpose of apprehending violators of either the criminal
prohibition against attempting to board an aircraft while carrying a
concealed weapon . . . or some other criminal statute. Such searches
would be criminal investigations subject to the warrant and probable
311
cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment.

Even today, implied consent is frequently cited as one of the
factors that courts consider in their balancing test, though not a
dispositive one. The Third Circuit has argued that searches of airline
passengers are “less offensive” because “[a]ir passengers choose to
312
fly,” and they are on notice that they will be searched at the airport.
Other courts have rejected suspicionless antiterrorism searches in
part because of a lack of implied consent. For example, the district
court that struck down the searches in the Boston subway noted that
proper notice would have “provide[d] an opportunity for persons who
313
do not want to permit inspection to avoid traveling on the MBTA,”
308. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 20 F.3d 926, 930 (1994) (“[W]e note that police officers
may search an area, even without probable cause or a warrant, if someone with adequate
authority has consented to the search . . . .”).
309. United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1973), abrogated by United States v.
Aukai, 497 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc).
310. Id. at 910–11.
311. Id. at 911–12 (citation omitted).
312. United States v. Hartwell, 436 F.3d 174, 180–81 (3d Cir. 2006).
313. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., No. 04-11652GAO, 2004 WL 1682859, at *3 (D. Mass. July 28, 2004).
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whereas the court that struck down the searches at Tampa’s stadium
noted that the plaintiff was never informed of the search policy
before purchasing his tickets and therefore could not have consented
314
to the search at the time of purchase. Conversely, the Second
Circuit upheld suspicionless searches in the New York subway in part
because the individuals being searched have a choice to either submit
315
to the search or turn away and not ride the subway.
But there is a significant problem associated with relying on
implied consent to justify suspicionless antiterrorism searches: the
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. This doctrine holds that it
could be unconstitutional if the government conditions participation
316
in a certain activity on the waiver of a constitutional right. The

314. Johnston v. Tampa Sports Auth., 442 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1271–72 (M.D. Fla. 2006), rev’d
per curiam, 490 F.3d 820 (11th Cir. 2007), vacated and superseded on reh’g, 530 F.3d 1320 (11th
Cir. 2008) (per curiam).
315. MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260, 273, 275 (2d Cir. 2006). The Second Circuit never
used implied consent as a legal justification for the search; instead it applied the fact that
individuals could choose to walk away as evidence that the search was “minimally intrusive,” id.
at 273, which is one of the three factors of the reasonableness balancing test for the special
needs doctrine, id. at 269.
There is a recent Ninth Circuit case that appears to hold that the constitutionality of
these searches does not depend on consent, but in reality it only specifies the type of consent
that is required. See United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955, 960 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). In
United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc), the defendant voluntarily
subjected himself to a metal detector and a secondary screening at the airport, but when he was
directed to empty his pockets, he refused, telling the TSA officials that he no longer wished to
board the plane and asking to leave the airport. Id. at 957–58. This request was refused, and a
subsequent search of the defendant revealed several baggies of methamphetamine and a glass
pipe. Id. at 958.
The Ninth Circuit relied on the administrative search doctrine to uphold the search,
and went out of its way to note that the constitutionality of the search did not depend on the
defendant’s consent; thus, the defendant could not revoke his consent and tell the officers that
he no longer wished to fly. Id. at 960–61. But a few sentences later it noted that “all that is
required [for the search to be constitutional] is the passenger’s election to attempt entry into the
secured area of an airport.” Id. at 961 (footnote omitted). Thus, for all its strong language about
consent not being a necessary element, it appears that the Aukai case simply specifies what kind
of consent is required, without abolishing a consent requirement altogether. Once individuals
choose to undertake an activity (and thus implicitly agree to a search), there comes a point at
which they cannot back out of the activity and withdraw their consent. In other words, this
holding is not inconsistent with a theory that would justify all suspicionless antiterrorism
searches using implied consent. For a recent discussion of these issues, see generally Bethany A.
Gulley, Case Note, United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2007), 31 U. ARK. LITTLE
ROCK L. REV. 515 (2009).
316. See, e.g., Adams v. James, 784 F.2d 1077, 1080 (11th Cir. 1986) (“The doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions prohibits terminating [prisoner] benefits, though not classified as
entitlements, if the termination is based on motivations that other constitutional provisions
proscribe.”); Bertrand v. United States, 467 F.2d 901, 902 (5th Cir. 1972) (per curiam) (ordering
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Bourgeois and Johnston courts rejected an implied-consent
justification on these grounds, noting that an individual’s right to
attend a protest or even a “property interest in his season tickets and
his right to attend [football] games and assemble with other
Buccaneers fans” could not be conditioned on a surrender of his
317
Fourth Amendment rights.
The reason the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions presents a
problem is that—like a generalized definition of reasonableness—this
doctrine also fails to provide a principled, bright-line test. The
Seventh Circuit notes that “conditions can lawfully be imposed on the
receipt of a benefit—conditions that may include the surrender of a
constitutional right, such as the right to be free from unreasonable
318
searches and seizures—provided the conditions are reasonable.”
Thus, attempting to use implied consent as a justification for
suspicionless searches leads to the same conclusion, and creates the
same problem—in the end it is up to the judge to decide, after
balancing all the factors, whether it is reasonable to condition the
right to travel by air (or enter a public courthouse or attend a football
game) on the individual’s waiver of their Fourth Amendment right.
And once again, the case law shows the inconsistency that inevitably
results from such a broad, discretionary test: courts have said that it is
unreasonable to condition entry to a football game or a rock concert
319
on a Fourth Amendment waiver; yet it is not unreasonable to
320
require consent before entering a courthouse or boarding a plane.
resentencing because “[t]he effect of the trial judge’s questioning [of the defendant] was to
impose an unconstitutional condition on the petitioner’s Fifth Amendment rights: he could go
into the details of the other offense . . . that might constitute a confession or he could exercise
his right to be silent and receive a long sentence”); Boykins v. Fairfield Bd. of Educ., 399 F.2d
11, 13 (5th Cir. 1968) (“The plaintiffs [were] admitted to the school system, but had been denied
the opportunity to transfer from a Negro to a white school. Once the plaintiffs had been
admitted to the school system, they had a constitutional right to a desegregated education, and
have standing to enforce that right—free of any unconstitutional condition precedent.” (quoting
Bossier Parish Sch. Bd. v. Lemon, 370 F.2d 847, 851 (5th Cir. 1967))).
317. Johnston, 442 F. Supp. 2d at 1271; accord Bourgeois v. Peters, 387 F.3d 1303, 1324–25
(11th Cir. 2004).
318. Burgess v. Lowery, 201 F.3d 942, 947 (7th Cir. 2000).
319. Johnston, 442 F. Supp. 2d at 1271; Nakamoto v. Fasi, 64 Haw. 17, 22–26 (1981).
320. The Supreme Court has perhaps provided a preview of how they would interpret the
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions in its “reasonable expectation of privacy” jurisprudence.
In Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979), the Court held that an individual has no reasonable
expectation of privacy in the telephone numbers he calls, because he “voluntarily”
communicates these numbers to the telephone company when he dials them. Id. at 744.
According to Smith’s reasoning, the only way to maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy in
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D. Antiterrorism Searches Are Sui Generis; Courts Should Create a
New Category of Suspicionless Searches
Another possibility is simply to concede that antiterrorism
searches are sui generis and create a new, narrowly tailored exception
to the individualized suspicion rule. This rule could be designed so
that it would apply only to searches designed to prevent terrorist
actions, thus responding to contemporary dangers without
unnecessarily broadening the scope of special needs searches in other
321
contexts. As one commentator noted: “[T]he exception might
expand to cover a variety of different search methods employed in
new contexts as the type of weapons and the types of targets changed
322
over time.” If the exception stood on its own doctrinal basis, none
323
of these changes would affect other types of suspicionless searches.
This is not a trivial benefit. As one commentator points out, this
country has conventionally recognized a “traditional criminal
324
process” and an emergency criminal process. The former, defined as
“investigation with the goal of proving criminal charges in an ordinary
325
criminal court,” provides substantial rights to defendants, including
the right to a speedy and public trial. The latter, which involves the
military justice system as well as special military tribunals that are
created during times of emergency, is a more flexible and efficient
process in which “constitutional and statutory rules apply more
leniently, [so] executive officials have discretion to craft strategies for
326
the specific needs of a particular investigation or other activity.”
Historically, these two types of criminal processes have remained
somewhat separate, but the government’s response to the 2001
terrorist attacks has changed that somewhat. Today, many of the
telephone numbers is to not use the telephone at all. A similar analysis applied to the doctrine
of unconstitutional conditions would invariably result in findings of implied consent for almost
every activity.
321. See Charles J. Keeley III, Note, Subway Searches: Which Exception to the Warrant and
Probable Cause Requirements Applies to Suspicionless Searches of Mass Transit Passengers to
Prevent Terrorism?, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 3231, 3287–91 (2006) (arguing for a sui generis
approach to mass transit searches).
322. Id. at 3289.
323. Id.
324. See Parry, supra note 3, at 766 (“[T]he ‘war on terror’ has accelerated the development
of a new criminal process and . . . this new process has increasingly displaced traditional
methods of investigating, prosecuting, and punishing people who have engaged in conduct that
is subject to criminal penalties . . . .”).
325. Id. at 791–92.
326. Id. at 792.
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extraordinary actions taken by the government in response to the
crisis posed by terrorist threats affect the traditional criminal process,
resulting in a hybrid process in which “legally authorized discretion is
increasingly valued as a way to respond to a steady stream of
327
perceived crises.” In practical terms, the current war on terror has
resulted not only in detention without charge and trial by a special
tribunal for terrorist suspects in Guantánamo, but also in enhanced
search and seizure powers against all citizens, including warrantless
wiretapping of overseas telephone calls, data mining of financial
information using national security letters, and more frequent
328
detention of material witnesses. Although suspicionless searches are
(for the most part) carried out by local law enforcement, they are part
of this same trend. If these heightened powers of surveillance can be
limited more explicitly to terrorism investigations, the incremental
expansion of these powers to everyday investigations can be
prevented.
Creating a new exception would also help to shore up the
integrity of the special needs doctrine—because preventing terrorism
is not really a special need distinct from law enforcement, courts
would no longer have to use terms like “administrative,”
“regulatory,” and “law enforcement purpose” in ways that have
nothing to do with their actual meaning. This could be a critical first
step to bringing logic and doctrinal consistency to what is now a very
confused jurisprudence.
The Supreme Court has even hinted that a new exception might
be appropriate for antiterrorism searches. Edmond, in which the
Court struck down a suspicionless roadblock designed to detect illegal
drug trafficking, commented in dicta that “the Fourth Amendment
would almost certainly permit an appropriately tailored roadblock set
329
up to thwart an imminent terrorist attack.” Although the Supreme
Court used the word imminent, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act (FISA) court later relied in part on this dictum to approve
330
wiretap applications that were meant to detect terrorist activity.
Noting that the Supreme Court had implicitly approved of applying

327. Id. at 835.
328. Id. at 770–82.
329. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000); see also Gould & Stern, supra
note 3, at 821–23 (analyzing the implications of this statement).
330. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 745–46 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002).
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the special needs doctrine in the case of “an imminent terrorist
attack,” the FISA court argued that “[t]he nature of the ‘emergency,’
which is simply another word for threat, takes [antiterrorism cases]
331
out of the realm of ordinary crime control.”
In a recent article, Judge Ronald Gould of the Ninth Circuit,
writing with his former law clerk Simon Stern, used this language to
support a new exception to the individualized suspicion
332
requirement. The authors proposed broadening the special needs
doctrine to allow any search as long as (1) the search is meant to
“prevent catastrophic harm;” (2) the search “goes beyond routine
police functions;” (3) the search is “as effective as is
practical . . . [and] minimize[s] harm to the public;” (4) the officers’
discretion is constrained and the search is not discriminatory; and (5)
under the totality of the circumstances, the balance favors the
governmental interest when compared with the infringement on the
333
privacy of those searched.
One problem with creating this new exception is evident both in
the FISA court’s opinion and in Gould and Stern’s proposed test:
even with a rule designed specifically for antiterrorism searches, the
slippery slope problem still exists. This slippery slope is even apparent
in the transition from Edmond’s dictum to the FISA court opinion:
Edmond spoke of a search to meet an imminent threat in an
emergency situation, but the FISA court—inexplicably equating
“emergency” with “threat”—used this language to justify a wiretap
when there was no evidence of an emergency or imminent harm. And
the Gould and Stern test contains a final factor that simply asks courts
to balance the governmental interest against the privacy
infringement—thus providing no principled bright-line test to guide
334
courts and limit the types of search that may be permitted.

331. Id. at 746.
332. Gould & Stern, supra note 3, at 823.
333. Id.
334. The Gould & Stern test is only one of many proposed tests that ultimately rely on the
reasonableness of the search. For example, Professor Edwin Butterfoss proposes a test first
developed by Scott Sundby twenty years ago—divide searches into two categories: “initiatory
intrusions” and “responsive intrusions.” See Butterfoss, supra note 252, at 488 (quoting Scott E.
Sundby, A Return to Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing the Mischief of Camara and Terry, 72
MINN. L. REV. 383, 418–21 (1988)). Responsive intrusions would be covered by the full range of
Fourth Amendment protections whereas initiatory intrusions would be subject to a balancing
test based on the subject’s reasonable expectation of privacy, the level of intrusion, and the
magnitude of the government interest. Id. at 488–95.
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Recently, Professor Ricardo J. Bascuas proposed his own test
that avoids the problematic “totality of the circumstances” language
found in many of the proposed antiterrorism exceptions. In an
attempt to set out concrete, principled guidelines for suspicionless
antiterrorism searches, Bascuas proposes a test that permits such
searches if: (1) they are “justified by credible, non-speculative
evidence of . . . danger;” (2) the “danger must entail imminent
physical injury;” and (3) “anything seized unrelated to the
335
danger . . . [is] suppressed.” This test goes a long way toward
providing stable guidelines for these searches, as well as preventing
pretextual searches in which law enforcement officials conducting
ordinary crime control claim to be deterring terrorist activity to
bypass ordinary Fourth Amendment rules.
But even a well-crafted, narrowly tailored exception for
antiterrorism searches is problematic; depending on how it is
interpreted, it is either too narrow or too broad. Bascuas’s proposal,
for example, requires “credible, non-speculative evidence” and
336
“imminent physical injury.” Bascuas uses these terms to distinguish
between the vague “alarmist policy arguments” that failed to justify
the search of protesters in Bourgeois with the concrete “sober
evidence” produced by the N.Y.P.D. to justify the subway searches in
337
MacWade. But what exactly constitutes credible, non-speculative
evidence of an imminent attack? In MacWade, the government
showed that there had been two plots to bomb the subway over the
past eight years, and that terrorists had recently bombed the subway
338
systems of three European cities. Although this surely demonstrates
that subway systems are a tempting target for terrorists, does it

335. Bascuas, supra note 2, at 781. The concept of precluding any evidence found that is not
related to the danger which justifies the search is an intriguing one. Justice Scalia suggested this
idea at one point in the context of Terry stops, saying that it is supported by “the theory that
half a constitutional guarantee is better than none.” Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 382
(1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“If I were of the view that Terry was (insofar as the power to
‘frisk’ is concerned) incorrectly decided, I might—even if I felt bound to adhere to that case—
vote to exclude the evidence incidentally discovered . . . .”). But ultimately this “half a
constitutional guarantee” is insufficient in the context of antiterrorism searches because it still
allows the government to conduct suspicionless searches and use the weapons that are
recovered in a subsequent criminal prosecution, thus bypassing the individualized suspicion
requirements of the Fourth Amendment.
336. Bascuas, supra note 2, at 781.
337. Id. at 786.
338. MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260, 264 (2d Cir. 2006).
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represent credible evidence of an imminent attack? And how would a
court apply this test to the original antiterrorism searches at airports
and public buildings? Terrorists have targeted airplanes, and
airplanes are particularly vulnerable to massively destructive acts of
violence, but is there any evidence that an attack on airplanes is
imminent? And what evidence exists to support an imminent attack
on judges or courthouses?
This critique is not specific to Professor Bascuas’s test; it applies
to any attempt to create a new antiterrorist exception to the Fourth
Amendment. Either it will only apply for a short period of time after
a credible threat has been detected in a certain area or venue, in
which case the search will no longer be justified once the imminence
wears off, or it will remain in place in perpetuity, like the searches at
airports and public courthouses, long after the concrete and imminent
339
threat has subsided. The latter, of course, is far more likely. And in
any case, it will still be the terrorists who control the scope of the
exception; successful attacks against a certain type of target—or even
foiled plots that are uncovered by law enforcement—will represent
credible evidence that an imminent (yet never-ending) threat exists
for that category of target nationwide.
***
This Part has considered four possible justifications for
suspicionless antiterrorism searches: using a generalized
reasonableness standard, relying on the legislature and the
democratic process to set the limits of what is reasonable, applying
the doctrine of implied consent, and creating an entirely new category
of suspicionless searches tailored for antiterrorism cases.
Unfortunately, none of these potential justifications are viable, which
leads—perhaps reluctantly—to the conclusion that these searches
should not be permissible at all.
VI. WHAT IF SUSPICIONLESS ANTITERRORISM SEARCHES ARE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL?
We have seen that suspicionless antiterrorism searches do not fit
into the administrative or special needs categories to which they have
been assigned. Because they are designed to prevent and detect
criminal behavior, and because law enforcement uses the results of
339.

See supra notes 57–66 and accompanying text.
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these searches, it is a legal fiction to say that they serve a purpose
other than law enforcement. Thus, only three options remain: abolish
the special needs threshold and simply analyze these searches under a
340
generalized reasonableness standard; create a new exception to the
individualized suspicion requirement and tailor that exception for
antiterrorism cases; or conclude that suspicionless antiterrorism
searches should be unconstitutional. There are problems with the first
two options: an unchecked slippery slope, an ominous but inexorable
(and probably irreversible) shift in perceptions of what constitutes a
reasonable search by the government, and ultimately allowing the
terrorists themselves to determine the scope of Fourth Amendment
341
liberties. In short, the first two options are essentially abandoning
principled limitations at a time when those principles are needed the
most. Therefore, it is at least worth asking: what if these searches
were found to be unconstitutional?
A. Abolishing Antiterrorism Searches
The simplest option would be to abolish antiterrorism searches
altogether. At first, this possibility seems unthinkable: surely no court
today would forbid the long-standing suspicionless searches at
airports and public courthouses. The very fact that this last option
seems unthinkable is itself deeply troubling: in only thirty years, the
notion of law enforcement agents subjecting individuals and their
belongings to suspicionless searches has become not just
constitutional and acceptable, but also thought to be indispensable.
The searches have become a part of our way of life, a part of our
culture, so that we have come to accept that there is no other way to
keep us safe on airplanes or in courthouses. In this sense, it may be
instructive to consider how “unthinkable” it was to many Americans
342
when the Supreme Court desegregated public schools, or when the
Supreme Court required suppression of any confession made without

340. The reasonableness test will apply even if law enforcement tries to rely on implied
consent to justify its searches, due to the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. See supra notes
311–17 and accompanying text.
341. See supra notes 285–307 and accompanying text.
342. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 394 U.S. 294, 299 (1955) (“Full implementation of these
constitutional principles may require solution of varied local school problems.”).
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an informed, express waiver of a right to counsel. Indeed, the
344
dissent in Miranda v. Arizona predicted that “a good many criminal
defendants who would otherwise have been convicted . . . will now,
under this new version of the Fifth Amendment, either not be tried at
345
all or will be acquitted.” Of course, nothing of the kind actually
occurred—instead, the Court merely forced law enforcement to
adhere to certain fundamental requirements of the right against selfincrimination, and law enforcement officers were able to adapt their
346
tactics so that defendants were still convicted at the same rate.
As with Miranda, the actual effect of declaring such searches
unconstitutional might be far less severe than it first appears. Even
without suspicionless searches, the police would be far from
powerless to detect and apprehend potential terrorists. As Professor
William Stuntz has pointed out, even if suspicionless searches were
347
not allowed, police could use existing authority to great effect.
According to Stuntz, the combination of Atwater v. City of Lago
348
Vista (which held that the police could make an arrest—and
therefore an attendant search—for any crime, regardless of how
349
350
trivial ), and Whren v. United States (which held that an officer’s
351
motive in conducting a search is irrelevant ) already give police
broad powers to conduct de facto suspicionless searches in almost any
343. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 492 (1966) (holding a criminal defendant’s
confession to police inadmissible without a “knowing and intelligent waiver” of Fifth
Amendment rights).
344. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
345. Id. at 542 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White continued rather dramatically:
In some unknown number of cases the Court’s rule will return a killer, a rapist or
other criminal to the streets and to the environment which produced him, to repeat
his crime whenever it pleases him. As a consequence, there will not be a gain, but a
loss, in human dignity. The real concern is not the unfortunate consequences of this
new decision on the criminal law as an abstract, disembodied series of authoritative
proscriptions, but the impact on those who rely on the public authority for protection
and who without it can only engage in violent self-help with guns, knives and the help
of their neighbors similarly inclined.
Id.
346. See, e.g., RICHARD A. LEO & GEORGE CONNER THOMAS, THE MIRANDA DEBATE:
LAW, JUSTICE, AND POLICING 56 (1998).
347. See Stuntz, supra note 307, at 2141. Professor Stuntz argues that the current system,
which allows police to conduct suspicionless antiterrorism searches in some contexts and
promises to allow them in many more as time goes on, represents a “healthy bribe” to the police
to prevent them from engaging in more intrusive and discriminatory searches. Id.
348. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001).
349. See id. at 354.
350. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
351. See id. at 813.
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352

context. When further combined with the low standard that justifies
a Terry search and the ease with which police can elicit consent,
police have plenty of options without resorting to suspicionless
353
searches.
In many contexts, particularly commercial air travel, private
companies would immediately pick up where law enforcement left
off. Allowing airlines to screen their own passengers and luggage
354
would pose no Fourth Amendment problems.
Public law
enforcement could focus on less intrusive methods of preventing air
piracy, such as increased use of sky marshals. New technologies could
be deployed that do not implicate the Fourth Amendment, such as
trace detection machines that only alert if illegal explosives are
355
detected.
In other contexts, such as suspicionless searches at public
buildings, the necessity argument is much weaker: is there really no
other way of protecting court personnel than to place a security
cordon around every government building and create a miniature
“green zone” on the inside? Is the threat posed by terrorists (or
ordinary criminals) so much more severe in the context of
government buildings that extraordinary search procedures are
justified there, as opposed to at a public school, or along a parade
route, or at a public sporting event?
At any rate, suspicionless searches at the entryway of public
buildings do nothing to prevent the threat of a real terrorist attack—a
car bomb or other large explosive being detonated outside, next to, or
underneath the building; currently, physical impediments (such as
bollards and setbacks from the road) prevent such crimes.

352. Stuntz, supra note 307, at 2158.
353. Given this existing broad authority, Stuntz argues that allowing an even greater range
of suspicionless searches and more carefully regulating the manner in which they are carried out
would be preferable. Id. at 2168–69.
354. Under the state action doctrine, the Fourth Amendment would be implicated as long as
these searches were required by the government, as has been the case since the early 1970s.
Thus, the government would have to abolish the requirement and allow airlines to take
responsibility for their own passengers’ safety. Consumers may or may not find this to be a
welcome development; private security guards may be more or less abusive—or more or less
effective—than government personnel.
355. A surveillance procedure that can only detect the presence or absence of illegal activity
is not considered a search under the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S.
696, 707 (1983) (concluding that luggage sniffing by narcotics detection dogs is not a search
under the Fourth Amendment).
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Furthermore, if law enforcement personnel had any reasonable
suspicion of a threat, they could still conduct Terry searches of that
individual. And lastly, the criminal law itself would provide a
powerful deterrent to any criminal activity, as it does in every other
context—in fact, the deterrence would be even more powerful than
usual because it is almost certain that anyone who committed a crime
inside a courthouse or other government building would be
apprehended, and security cameras would provide solid evidence at
any subsequent trial.
But most people would say these safeguards are not nearly
enough. At airports, private security guards may not be as well
trained as government agents, and the threat that terrorists pose to air
traffic is a matter of national security, not to be left to the cost-benefit
calculations of the private sector. At courthouses, there may be
certain times when higher security is required—during the trial of a
particularly high-profile terrorist, or after a credible threat has been
received regarding a city or public buildings generally. And as far as
the deterrent effect of the criminal sanction, many terrorists have
proven themselves to be undeterrable; thus, the prospect of being
captured and imprisoned after their crime has been committed will do
little to prevent them from carrying out their actions.
The special needs doctrine provides a ready solution to these
problems: suspicionless searches could be permitted as long as the
government is not permitted to use any fruits of the search in a
subsequent prosecution. In other words, such a search would be
perfectly legal—because it is justified by the special need of
protecting public safety—so citizens could not bring any civil suits
against government agents who conducted suspicionless searches for
terrorists. If the government agents, however, sought to use the
evidence recovered in the search in a subsequent prosecution, a court
would conclude that the search was no longer a special need search,
but rather was conducted for the purpose of crime control, and so the
search would be unconstitutional. Thus, the searches would be
allowed to prevent any terrorist attack from occurring, but the
exclusionary rule would apply so that any contraband that was
recovered would be precluded from use during any subsequent
criminal trial.
B. Allowing the Searches, but Precluding the Evidence
Although at first this proposal sounds radical (not to mention
politically unpalatable), it finds strong support in criminal procedure

SIMMONS IN FINAL.DOC

916

1/5/2010 2:12:49 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 59:843

jurisprudence. Most importantly, it comports with the legitimate
justification for special needs searches. Originally, suspicionless
searches were allowed only if the government agents were conducting
the search for a purpose other than generalized crime control. This
threshold requirement has been watered down to nonexistence over
the decades, culminating in the rather absurd—but consistently
repeated—assertion that preventing terrorist actions is not a law
enforcement purpose. Not every special needs search suffered from
this fatal weakness: some—the original administrative searches—
sought information for a legitimate regulatory purpose. Others—for
example, the cases involving drug testing of school children or public
employees—involved searches for unambiguously criminal activity,
356
but did not use the results for criminal prosecutions. If the
government did not use the results of suspicionless antiterrorist
searches in a subsequent prosecution, these searches would fall
squarely into the second category of special needs searches, alongside
357
the drug tests of Acton, Skinner, and Von Raab. To carry the
analogy with the drug testing cases one step further, under the current
doctrine, suspicionless antiterrorist searches at airports are really the
same as the invalidated drug tests in Ferguson, in which the public
hospital tested pregnant mothers—supposedly to protect the health of
the mother and fetus—and then turned the results over to law
358
enforcement. If the fruits of the search were barred from use in
future criminal prosecution, these searches would become more like
those of schoolchildren in Acton and public train drivers in Skinner.
Essentially, barring the government from using the fruits of the
search in a subsequent prosecution would accomplish very simply
what many courts have been trying to establish throughout the
tortured history of antiterrorism searches: ensure that the actual
purpose of the search is to prevent terrorist actions, rather than to
detect, apprehend, and prosecute criminals. The court in MacWade,
for example, concluded that the New York subway search program
served a need other than law enforcement because the officers
“search only those containers capable of carrying explosive devices,

356. See supra Part IV.A.
357. See supra Part IV.A.
358. See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 71–73 (2001); see also supra notes 242–
51 and accompanying text.
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and they may not intentionally search for other contraband.”
Likewise, some of the first courts to review suspicionless airport
searches relied on the implied consent of the suspect being searched
as evidence that the search was narrowly tailored to prevent
terrorism, and therefore did not serve a general crime-control
360
purpose. But these arguments do not really show that the searches
serve a need other than law enforcement; they merely perpetuate the
fiction that detecting and arresting people who seek to blow up
361
subway cars or airplanes is not a law enforcement purpose. If the
results of a search were not used in a future criminal prosecution,
there would be no doubt that “the essential purpose of the scheme is
not to detect weapons or explosives or to apprehend those who carry
them, but to deter persons carrying such material from seeking to
362
board at all.”
Another way of looking at this rule is to say that if law
enforcement officials decide to use the fruits of the search in a
criminal prosecution, it would create a conclusive presumption that
the search was conducted for traditional law enforcement purposes,
thus triggering the Fourth Amendment’s individualized suspicion
requirements. This would create a simple solution to the problem that
the Supreme Court created with Edmond and Ferguson: how to
determine when a search was conducted for traditional law
enforcement purposes.
Adopting this rule would mean that the focus of suspicionless
antiterrorist searches would truly be on prevention, not on
apprehension and subsequent punishment. Of course, applying the
exclusionary rule would make these searches less effective at
359. MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260, 270 (2d Cir. 2006).
360. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 910–11 (9th Cir. 1973) (“To meet the test
of reasonableness, an administrative screening search must be as limited in its intrusiveness as is
consistent with satisfaction of the administrative need that justifies it. It follows that airport
screening searches are valid only if they recognize the right of a person to avoid search by
electing not to board the aircraft. It is difficult to see how the need to prevent weapons and
explosives from being carried aboard the plane could justify the search of a person who had
elected not to board.” (footnotes omitted)), abrogated by United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955
(9th Cir. 2007) (en banc).
361. Professor Bascuas makes a similar, if more sophisticated argument by proposing to
exclude any contraband that is “unrelated to the justification for suspicionless searches.”
Bascuas, supra note 2, at 787–88. This rule would ensure that antiterrorism searches are not
used as pretexts for generalized crime-control searches, which is one of Bascuas’s chief
concerns. See id. at 758–69. But it does not go far enough because it does not address the
fundamental hypocrisy of categorizing antiterrorism searches as special needs searches.
362. See Davis, 482 F.2d at 908.
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prevention. Currently the risk of getting caught and ultimately going
to prison is a strong deterrent to at least some potential terrorists, and
incapacitation through incarceration can help to ensure that any
particular criminal who gets caught will no longer be a threat for the
time he is in prison. But many potential terrorist suspects are
impossible to deter by any means, and so the absence of a threat of
prison is unlikely to alter their behavior. And although they cannot be
incapacitated through incarceration based on the recovered items, the
government is not without options once a suspect is caught. Law
enforcement agents could interview the suspect to learn more about
363
his plans. They could begin surveillance on the suspect. In many
cases, they would be able to institute deportation proceedings against
the suspect. These options would not be as effective as using the
results of the search in the criminal prosecution—but again, the focus
of the suspicionless searches is by definition not bringing the suspect
to justice; rather, it is preventing the terrorist act from occurring.
In dissent, Justice Marshall argued in favor of this sort of rule in
the Fifth Amendment context, pointing out that if a police officer
wished to protect public safety, he or she was free to ignore the
Miranda rules—but that this should not somehow render the
compelled testimony admissible:
If a bomb is about to explode or the public is otherwise
imminently imperiled, the police are free to interrogate suspects
without advising them of their constitutional rights. Such
unconsented questioning may take place not only when police
officers act on instinct but also when higher faculties lead them to
believe that advising a suspect of his constitutional rights might
decrease the likelihood that the suspect would reveal life-saving
364
information.

Marshall acknowledged that in certain situations, this would
mean the defendant would go free if there were no other way to
prosecute him for the crime. But “however frequently or infrequently
363. Although the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine would prevent law enforcement
officials from using any evidence that was discovered as a direct result of the suspicionless
search (for example, a confession resulting from the subsequent arrest), it would not preclude
law enforcement from beginning to monitor the public activities of the suspect and gather
evidence of any new crimes against him. See generally Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,
487–88 (1963) (describing operation of the “fruit of the poisonous” tree doctrine in the context
of illegal police actions).
364. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 686 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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such cases arise, their regularity is irrelevant. The Fifth Amendment
365
prohibits compelled self-incrimination.”
Of course, the Court rejected Justice Marshall’s argument in the
Fifth Amendment context, creating a public safety exception to the
366
Miranda rule. Yet the Supreme Court has confirmed that—outside
the public safety context—law enforcement officers are faced with a
choice: they are free to ignore Miranda as long as they do not use any
367
subsequent statements at a criminal trial. Allowing suspicionless
antiterrorism searches but precluding the evidence from trial would
give the officers the same choice.
Many would argue that the analogy with Fifth Amendment
jurisprudence is fallacious. The Fifth Amendment precludes
compelled self-incrimination, which naturally leads courts to conclude
that the Amendment does not apply if the statements are not used in
368
a criminal case. The Fourth Amendment’s text is much broader; it
precludes all “unreasonable searches,” regardless of how the
government uses these searches. And the Supreme Court has said
numerous times that the Fourth Amendment applies with equal force
to civil and criminal cases, whether or not the evidence is used in a
369
subsequent trial.

365. Id. at 687.
366. Id. at 657–58 (majority opinion). The Court employed reasoning quite similar to what is
used to justify suspicionless antiterrorism searches in the Fourth Amendment context, id.,
noting that “we do not believe that the doctrinal underpinnings of Miranda require that it be
applied in all its rigor to a situation in which police officers ask questions reasonably prompted
by a concern for the public safety,” id. at 658 n.7.
367. See, e.g., Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 766 (2003) (reasoning that Fifth
Amendment rights are not implicated when statements by a subject of a police investigation are
not admitted in a criminal proceeding). Just as with suspicionless antiterrorism searches, the
courts seem unwilling to apply this doctrine when there is a vague risk to public safety—even
though the existence of a danger to public safety has no bearing on whether or not a statement
is the result of a coercive interrogation. See Parry, supra note 3, at 816–18 (noting that
“interrogation issues . . . are litigated along two tracks,” and using this as an example of how a
“new criminal process”—more like war and less like crime control—“restricts the space in
which constitutional rights operate to the courtroom alone”).
368. The Fifth Amendment is also distinct from the Fourth Amendment in that the former
provides a right and a remedy together—effectively stating that compelled testimony is
inadmissible in a criminal proceeding. The Fourth Amendment provides a right but no remedy,
which has led to courts creating the exclusionary rule.
369. See, e.g., Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 530 (1967) (“But we cannot agree that
the Fourth Amendment interests at stake in these inspection cases are merely ‘peripheral.’ It is
surely anomalous to say that the individual and his private property are fully protected by the
Fourth Amendment only when the individual is suspected of criminal behavior.” (quoting Frank
v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 367 (1959), overruled by Camara, 387 U.S. 523)).
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But the special needs doctrine itself is proof that this is not in fact
how the Fourth Amendment has been applied: if evidence that is
found as a result of a search is not used for a criminal prosecution, the
Court is willing to suspend the individualized suspicion requirement.
As it turns out, this is a perfectly sensible distinction. Shifting the
focus from the purpose of the search to the use of the results helps to
resolve a glaring inconsistency in Fourth Amendment law.
The Supreme Court has made it clear that judges should not
delve into the subjective intentions of law enforcement officers who
370
conduct a search —yet the purpose of the search is a critical issue in
deciding whether the special needs doctrine applies. If the fruits of
the search are never used in a subsequent criminal prosecution, it is
easy to determine that the purpose of the search was other than law
enforcement. But otherwise it is almost impossible to distinguish
between the purpose of the search (the determinative question in
special needs cases) and the subjective intentions of those who
conduct the search (an improper inquiry under current Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence).
One commentator tries to resolve this inconsistency by
distinguishing between the “motive” of a search and the “fringe
371
benefits” of the search, or by inquiring whether or not crime control
was the “causative or substantive factor” in the decision to conduct
372
the search. The Supreme Court itself in Ferguson tried to draw a
distinction between the immediate purpose of the search and the
ultimate purpose of the search—or whether law enforcement was a
373
means to an end or a happy side effect of the search. But none of
this matters to the suspect who is being searched; his reasonable
expectation of privacy is being infringed upon to the same degree
regardless of the motive of the search.
In other words, one should pay less attention to why the search
was conducted—which requires courts to delve into the mind of the
police officers or police officials, and probably has multiple

370. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (declining to analyze the
subjective intent of police officers in the context of the Fourth Amendment).
371. Brooks Holland, The Road ‘Round Edmond: Steering Through Primary Purposes and
Crime Control Agenda, 111 PENN ST. L. REV. 293, 305 (2006).
372. Id. at 309.
373. See supra notes 242–51 and accompanying text.
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374

answers —and instead focus on how the results of the search are
used once they are acquired: are they used as evidence in a criminal
prosecution or merely to establish regulatory violations, maintain
school discipline, or prevent a bomb from coming on board an
airplane? This distinction is logical: an individual who is being
searched by a law enforcement officer does not care why the officer is
searching him—a checkpoint and visual search of a car pursuant to a
375
drunk-driving checkpoint is just as intrusive as a checkpoint and
visual search of a car by officers looking for information on a recent
376
hit and run. But a subject is likely to care quite a bit about whether
the results of the search will later be used in a criminal prosecution
against him.
In short, one of the primary reasons for limiting the power of the
state when it conducts searches is the state’s ability to use the fruits of
the search to prosecute individuals. What the special needs cases
indicate is that these searches become less intrusive—and thus
possibly constitutional—if the law enforcement agent does not use
the results of the search in a subsequent criminal prosecution.
C. Responding to Potential Criticisms
A rule allowing suspicionless antiterrorism searches would find
plenty of opposition on both ends of the political spectrum. To
conservatives, the idea that a police officer could apprehend a
criminal attempting to blow up an airplane or shoot a judge and then
not be allowed to use the recovered evidence against the criminal
might seem ludicrous. But of course this is already the law in every
other Fourth Amendment context: if law enforcement officers search
someone without any individualized suspicion and recover
contraband of any kind, the exclusionary rule precludes the
contraband from being used in court. There is no reason why certain
crimes should be exempt from the exclusionary rule, however serious
they may be. Of course, the exclusionary rule itself has been the

374. Of course, it is somewhat easier to determine the purpose of a search if courts look to
the programmatic purpose of the search, as opposed to the individual motive of the officer
conducting the search, but by either definition any given search would probably have multiple
purposes.
375. See supra notes 234–41 and accompanying text.
376. See supra note 241. Compare City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 48 (2000)
(holding the Indianapolis drunk driving checkpoint system unconstitutional under the Fourth
Amendment), with Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 427–28 (2004) (upholding the
constitutionality of police checkpoints used to ask motorists about a hit-and-run incident).
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377

subject of a significant amount of criticism, but for the moment it
remains the centerpiece of enforcement for criminal procedure
violations, and so in a sense this Article merely proposes that the rule
should be applied to every search, regardless of the type of crime
378
being investigated.
Liberals, meanwhile, might worry about abuse on the part of law
enforcement: if police no longer need to worry about violating the
Fourth Amendment, what will prevent them from conducting overly
379
intrusive searches when searching for terrorists? One response to
this concern is to take a realistic look at the state of the suspicionless
search doctrine. Many courts have held that antiterrorism searches
meet the regulatory purpose of protecting public safety. And most
courts that have rejected the special needs test for antiterrorism
searches (such as Johnston or Seglen) are willing to change their
minds if there is credible evidence of a terrorist threat—thus opening
the door to widespread, indiscriminate suspicionless searches in the
name of preventing terrorism. The only other check under current
law on the government’s ability to conduct such searches is that they
must be reasonable—and as this Article demonstrates, this is at best
an unpredictable test, with the government more and more likely to
win as the terrorist threat (or the perceived terrorist threat) increases.
Thus, under current law the government does not face many obstacles
in creating suspicionless antiterrorism searches—and if the
government agents overstep their bounds and conduct a search that is
unreasonable, the usual remedy is simply that the evidence cannot be
used in court—which would be no different from the result under the
380
proposed rule.
377. See H. Mitchell Caldwell, Fixing the Constable’s Blunder: Can One Trial Judge in One
County in One State Nudge a Nation Beyond the Exclusionary Rule?, 2006 BYU L. REV. 1, 1–2
(surveying criticism of the exclusionary rule). See generally Amar, supra note 33, at 785–800
(critiquing the exclusionary rule as a remedy for violations of constitutional rights).
378. Even if the exclusionary rule is eventually abolished by the Supreme Court, the
rationale for excluding contraband recovered in special needs searches remains because the
search can only be honestly termed “special needs” if the results of the search are not used
against the suspect in a criminal trial.
379. Judge Friendly, for example, warned against unbridled searches if police were no
longer concerned with the Fourth Amendment. See Henry J. Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a
Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CAL. L. REV. 929, 949 (1965) (analyzing the relationship of the
exclusionary rule to the Fourth Amendment).
380. It is true, of course, that individuals whose Fourth Amendment rights are violated have
the right to bring a civil rights suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See, e.g., Torbet v. United Airlines,
298 F.3d 1087, 1088 (9th Cir. 2002) (presenting factual background for a statutory claim of a
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Another response to those worried about overly intrusive
searches is that even if the Fourth Amendment allowed
indiscriminate suspicionless antiterrorism searches, the Due Process
Clause would still apply to limit the search method used by the police
381
and prevent abuses of this power. There is a long history of case law
that defines the due process limits of police activity, leading to a wellestablished test: police activity that is “so brutal and so offensive to
human dignity” that it “shocks the conscience” violates an
382
individual’s due process rights. If an antiterrorism search was so
extremely abusive that it met this high standard, the subject of the
search would be able to recover damages from the law enforcement
383
officer.
For example, a brief pat-down search of every person who enters
the subway system at a certain station could be termed a special needs
search. As long as the police do not seek to use any contraband

Fourth Amendment rights violation). These lawsuits are rare, however, and are not the primary
mechanism for enforcing the Fourth Amendment.
381. As noted above, Fifth Amendment jurisprudence already has a similar two-tier system:
if the government agents want to use an individual’s statements against him in a criminal trial, it
must comply with Miranda and all the other Fifth Amendment requirements. If it has no
intention of using the information at trial, it need not comply with Miranda—but it is not
completely unregulated. See, e.g., Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 773 (2003) (“Our views on
the proper scope of the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause do not mean that police
torture or other abuse that results in a confession is constitutionally permissible so long as the
statements are not used at trial; it simply means that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause, rather than the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause, would govern the inquiry
in those cases and provide relief in appropriate circumstances.”).
382. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172, 174 (1952); see also Breithaupt v. Abram, 352
U.S. 432, 435 (1957) (holding that a blood test taken from a criminal defendant does not “shock
the conscience”). It is true that the Supreme Court has said that if police action is covered by
the Fourth Amendment, the Due Process Clause will not apply to the search. See, e.g., Graham
v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394–95 (1989) (“Because the Fourth Amendment provides an explicit
textual source of constitutional protection against this sort of physically intrusive governmental
conduct, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of ‘substantive due process,’ must
be the guide for analyzing these claims.”). A search that is truly a special needs search (in that
the fruits of the search are not used in a subsequent prosecution), however, could be considered
to be outside the scope of the Fourth Amendment and therefore covered by the Due Process
Clause.
383. If this standard is too low, or if the threat of civil lawsuits is so weak that it is
insufficient to deter abusive police behavior, there is nothing preventing cities, states, or the
federal government from passing legislation to raise the standards, or make lawsuits easier to
file, or to prohibit certain specific egregious practices. See generally Parry, supra note 3, at 819–
20 (discussing potential legislative or judicial responses to illegal police actions). Here is one
place in which political process theory would predict intervention by the legislature, especially if
the abusive practices were used during widespread, indiscriminate suspicionless searches (and if
they were not, the subjects of the search could conceivably file an equal protection claim).

SIMMONS IN FINAL.DOC

924

1/5/2010 2:12:49 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 59:843

recovered in such a search in a subsequent criminal trial, the search
would not violate the Fourth Amendment. And because the pat-down
search did not shock the conscience, it would not violate the Due
Process Clause, and thus would not subject the police officer to any
civil liability.
If the police officers, however, sought to use the recovered
evidence in a subsequent criminal trial, the search would no longer be
considered a special needs search and would violate the Fourth
Amendment (leading to exclusion of the evidence and potential civil
liability against the officer). And if the police conducted a blatantly
overintrusive search—say, conducting a suspicionless strip search of
some of the passengers—a court could find that the search shocked
the conscience and violated the Due Process Clause, thus opening up
the officer to civil liability.
But of course fear of civil judgments would not be the real check
on police behavior. Just as under current law, the exclusionary rule
would provide a strong incentive for police officers to find some other
way to conduct the search that would allow them to use the evidence
in court.
Essentially, this proposal would give law enforcement officers a
choice: if their true goal was to prevent an armed criminal from
boarding a plane—or boarding a subway, or entering a public
courthouse, or entering a sports arena, or attending a protest, or
driving near a dam—they could set up a suspicionless search program
to detect any explosives or other weapons, ensuring that such
contraband is confiscated and the terrorist act is prevented. If their
goal is to apprehend the armed criminal and bring him to trial—in
other words, if they have a criminal law purpose—they would need to
design a search regime that comported with the usual Fourth
Amendment requirements, which would include some form of
individualized suspicion.
Thus, the rule would have several benefits. First, it would give
law enforcement the flexibility to decide which priority is more
important for the given context. If there is a credible threat that must
be responded to regarding, say, a specific trial or protest, law
enforcement officers could develop a suspicionless search regime,
emphasizing prevention at all costs and abandoning their crime
detection function. But in the absence of a credible threat, law
enforcement officers would decide to revert to legitimate surveillance
procedures, the results of which could be used in court. The decision
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of which type of search to use would be made by the individuals in the
best position to make such a decision: law enforcement officers
themselves. And unlike the searches at airports and courthouses—
which became legally and thus culturally entrenched, and are now
permanently part of American life—intrusive security procedures
that are put into place because of the increased threat would only be
temporary, until the specific, credible threat receded and the police
decided to shift priorities to attempt to apprehend and prosecute
perpetrators.
Second, the rule would give law enforcement more powers to
search if it were truly intending only to prevent a terrorist attack.
They would no longer have to worry about whether their actions
complied with the inconsistent and ever-changing case law in this
area, and they would no longer have to prove that they had a specific
and concrete threat (and they would no longer need to guess about
what a judge might think that term means). But the ban on using the
fruits of these searches would be an automatic check against police
frequently resorting to overly intrusive techniques: the fact that the
contraband that is recovered cannot be used in subsequent criminal
proceedings would provide a strong incentive for law enforcement to
conduct this type of search sparingly. And, as discussed above, the
Equal Protection Clause and Due Process Clause would still apply,
precluding any discriminatory or extraordinarily intrusive searches.
Finally, this rule would provide police with a strong incentive to
develop more effective but less intrusive methods of antiterrorism
surveillance, such as machines that could detect the presence of
explosives or firearms without revealing any other information about
384
the suspect and without subjecting him to a physical search. As
noted above, banning suspicionless searches entirely would provide
an even stronger incentive, but would also compromise security in
those situations in which there is a real threat of a terrorist attack.
384. These types of searches are known as binary searches because they are designed to only
tell a law enforcement officer whether or not illegal conduct is occurring, without other
information about the suspect—essentially producing an output of either “yes” or “no.”
Examples of binary searches currently in widespread use by law enforcement are drug-sniffing
dogs and narcotics field tests. These searches do not implicate the Fourth Amendment under
the Katz standard because they do not violate a reasonable expectation of privacy. See United
States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (holding that an inspection by a narcotics dog trained to
sniff contraband without opening passengers’ luggage does not violate the passengers’ Fourth
Amendment rights). For a further discussion of the legality of binary searches, see Ric
Simmons, Technology-Enhanced Surveillance by Law Enforcement Officials, 60 N.Y.U. ANN.
SURVEY AM. L. 711, 718–19 (2005).
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This rule still encourages creativity and innovation in developing less
intrusive surveillance tools and procedures, but would ensure that law
enforcement could still provide protection when necessary.
CONCLUSION
When antiterrorism searches first began, they no doubt seemed
reasonable to the public and to the courts. In the late 1960s, air piracy
and domestic terrorism were seen as real threats to the United States’
security, and law enforcement seemed powerless to combat these
threats through ordinary means. Instituting a regime of blanket
suspicionless searches was the only effective solution—and the
searches were indeed effective. Once the problem was solved, why
would anyone want to dismantle the search regimes and revive the
old dangers and risks?
Likewise, the administrative search doctrine began innocently
enough. Health inspectors had an important job to do, and they could
not do it effectively if they needed to generate individualized
suspicion before conducting their inspections. And because their
inspections were far removed from the harm the Fourth Amendment
was meant to prevent, allowing suspicionless searches for purely
regulatory purposes seemed harmless—a thoughtful compromise
based on the reasonableness language in the Fourth Amendment.
But in both instances, this Article demonstrates that these
reasonable compromises have grown into an inconsistent tangle of
case law, justified by a broad Fourth Amendment loophole whose
premise—that detecting and preventing violent crime is not a law
enforcement purpose—borders on the absurd. It is long past time to
restore logic and principle to this area of the law, and the new wave of
suspicionless antiterrorism searches presents courts with the perfect
opportunity to do so. Precedent already exists in the special needs
doctrine—numerous drug testing cases such as Acton and Von Raab
look to how the fruits of the search are utilized as part of the test to
determine whether the search was conducted for a law enforcement
purpose. The obstacles are the thirty-five-year-old precedents,
which—against all logic—held that searching airline passengers and
courthouse visitors for weapons was a regulatory function.
These obstacles are all the more daunting because the searches
that they affirm are now a generally accepted—and even welcome—
part of everyday life. But if they are left undisturbed, the government
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will continue using them to justify antiterrorism suspicionless searches
in dozens of other contexts, and courts will be forced to approve of
them all or to manufacture artificial distinctions between cases,
creating an inconsistency and unpredictability that will inevitably
leach into other special needs cases. By excluding the fruits of these
searches from future criminal prosecutions, the courts will provide a
simple, principled distinction between legitimate and illegitimate
suspicionless searches—and their claims that these searches fulfill a
special need other than law enforcement will actually be true.

